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The Jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and Forum 
Shopping in Money Claims Against the Federal 
Government 
GREGORY C. SISK* 
[D]espite [the claimant’s] valiant effort to frame the suit as one for 
declaratory or injunctive relief, this kind of litigation should be 
understood for what it is. At bottom it is a suit for money for which the 
Court of Federal Claims can provide an adequate remedy, and it 
therefore belongs in that court. 
       Judge S. Jay Plager1 
 
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 84 
I. THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AND THE ADEQUACY OF MONEY JUDGMENTS ....... 87 
A. THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION  
OVER MONEY CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ........................................ 87 
B. JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AFTER THE  
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN BOWEN V. MASSACHUSETTS ............................... 90 
C. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CONFIRMATION OF EXCLUSIVE  
JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS WHEN A  
MONEY JUDGMENT IS ADEQUATE ....................................................................... 94 
II. DISTRICT COURT V. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS: THE JURISDICTIONAL  
TUG-OF-WAR IN INDIAN BREACH OF TRUST CLAIMS ..................................................... 101 
A. THE UNPRECEDENTED PROJECTION OF DISTRICT COURT AUTHORITY OVER 
MONEY DISPUTES IN COBELL V. BABBITT ........................................................... 101 
B. THE ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES IN THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS  
AND THE DISTRICT COURT IN INDIAN BREACH OF TRUST CASES ...................... 106 
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL COLLISION IN UNITED STATES V. TOHONO  
O’ODHAM NATION .............................................................................................................. 129 
A. DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION IN BOTH THE DISTRICT COURT  
AND THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS .............................................................. 129 
B. THE AFTERMATH OF TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION .......................................... 133 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 149 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © Gregory C. Sisk 2013. 
 * Laghi Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law 
(Minnesota) (gcsisk@stthomas.edu). For generous comments on an earlier draft, the author 
thanks Donald Groves, Jeffrey Haynes, Craig Schwartz, Daniel Syrdal, and Daniel Thies, 
none of whom is responsible for any errors that remain or should be held to have endorsed 
the analysis. A portion of this Article is adapted from and expands on an amicus curiae brief 
filed by the author in the Supreme Court. Brief of Professor Gregory C. Sisk as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 
1723 (2011) (No. 09-846). 
 1. Suburban Mortg. Assocs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116, 
1118 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 




Over the past decade, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
issued a series of opinions2 clarifying the jurisdictional priority of the United States 
Court of Federal Claims (CFC) under the Tucker Act (which authorizes non-tort 
money claims against the United States)3 over a variety of claims against the 
federal government that are essentially means to a monetary end. In these cases, 
plaintiffs had cleverly or mistakenly transformed financial disputes into requests 
for injunctive or declaratory relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)4 
that purportedly could be filed in U.S. District Court. 
Because the APA expressly excludes judicial review in District Court when an 
“adequate remedy” lies in another court,5 the Federal Circuit has repeatedly 
confirmed that the CFC retains its traditional and exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
claims against the federal government that are adequately remedied by a money 
judgment. The Federal Circuit’s leading jurisdictional decisions, emphasizing the 
sufficiency of a money judgment in the CFC to resolve claims that are essentially 
pecuniary in nature, have arisen in such varied contexts as an objection by nuclear 
utilities to government assessments for costs in decontaminating uranium 
processing facilities;6 a claim by a federally subsidized, low-income housing 
project that the government breached a contract by refusing to permit adequate 
rental increases, which in turn led to foreclosure on the housing project’s federally 
insured mortgage;7 and efforts by a lender to force assignment to and obtain 
reimbursement from the government on a defaulted nursing home mortgage under a 
federal mortgage guarantee program.8 
In recent years, the jurisdictional tug-of-war between the Court of Federal 
Claims (under the Tucker Act) and the District Court (under the APA) has been 
most sharply featured in the adjudication of a series of breach of trust claims 
presented by individual Native Americans and American Indian tribes against the 
federal government. While the governing principles and jurisdictional lines drawn 
in statutory waivers of sovereign immunity and accompanying jurisdictional 
enactments generally apply across the wide diversity of disputes involving the 
federal government, the problem of forum shopping has emerged most prominently 
in Indian breach of trust litigation since the late 1990s. 
Since the enactment of the Indian Tucker Act in 1946 (which authorizes money 
claims by Indian tribes against the United States),9 the Court of Federal Claims has 
been the forum for Indian breach of trust claims alleging the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. See infra Part I.C. 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006 & Supp. II 2009); infra Part I.A. 
 4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2006). 
 5. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 6. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 247 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 7. Christopher Vill., L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 8. Suburban Mortg. Assocs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006). 
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government’s failure to uphold its fiduciary responsibilities in managing Native 
American funds and resources. The Supreme Court’s landmark Indian breach of 
trust decisions over the past several decades have been rendered in cases that began 
in the CFC or its predecessors.10 In recent years, the Federal Circuit has reaffirmed 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFC over Indian breach of trust claims alleging 
government mismanagement of Native American funds.11 
The venerable understanding that Indian breach of trust claims involving 
individual or tribal assets are to be pursued as claims for money in the CFC was 
disturbed by an aberrational decision, Cobell v. Babbit,12 issued a little more than a 
decade ago by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and later 
affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In that 
case, the District Court asserted authority under the APA to adjudicate the 
management and evaluate the records of government-established financial 
accounts, which were used to distribute to individuals the profits derived from 
Native American resources held in trust by the United States.13 
In assuming jurisdiction over the Cobell case, the District Court aggressively 
extended the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts14—a 
unique case arising from the federal-state administration of the Medicaid health 
care program that the Supreme Court had found unsuited for review in the CFC.15 
Although the Cobell complaint was framed as a request for an historical financial 
accounting of individual Indian trust accounts, the case always was about missing 
money, as eventually confirmed by the 2010 congressionally approved $3.4 billion 
settlement of the Cobell litigation.16 
In the years following the District Court jurisdictional ruling in Cobell, dozens 
of other Indian tribes followed suit (pun intended) by lodging their complaints in 
District Court. In these cases, the tribes reformulated Indian breach of trust 
disputes—that previously would have been destined for the CFC as claims for a 
money judgment—into equitable requests for an accounting of trust assets that 
purportedly could be filed instead in District Court.17 Indeed, to justify pursuit of 
breach of trust claims in District Court, these tribes denigrated the ability of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); 
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 
206 (1983). See infra Part II.B.1. 
 11. See E. Shawnee Tribe of Okla. v. United States, 582 F.3d 1306, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011).  
 12. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–28 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 
1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. 487 U.S. 879 (1988). 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064. On the 
settlement, see generally infra notes 167–168 and accompanying text. 
 17. See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Norton, 527 F. Supp. 2d 130, 130–32 (D.D.C. 
2007) (listing cases). 
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CFC to provide full relief in such cases,18 notwithstanding that other tribes have 
continued to pursue remedies for breach of trust solely in the CFC.19 
To add to the jurisdictional chaos, several tribal plaintiffs not only filed breach 
of trust claims in District Court seeking an accounting and monetary restitution, but 
simultaneously filed parallel breach of trust lawsuits in the CFC that forthrightly 
sought money damages under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act.20 Because 
28 U.S.C. § 1500 bars the CFC from taking jurisdiction if the plaintiff “has pending 
in any other court any suit or process against the United States” that is “for or in 
respect to” the same “claim,”21 the filing of these duplicative suits created an even 
more immediate and direct jurisdictional collision. 
In 2011, in United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,22 the Supreme Court 
reiterated that lawsuits filed in the CFC must be dismissed under § 1500 if parallel 
litigation is pending in District Court.23 Reading § 1500 as “a robust response” to 
the burdens of duplicative litigation against the United States,24 the Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff may not maintain one lawsuit in the CFC while a second 
lawsuit is proceeding in another court that arises out of the same operative facts, 
even if the two lawsuits seek wholly different relief.25 
Although the direct question before the Supreme Court in Tohono was the force 
of the CFC jurisdictional bar in § 1500, the Court’s analysis sheds light on the 
underlying question of the proper forum for claims that ultimately seek or could be 
satisfied by a money judgment available under the Tucker Act in the CFC.26 In 
rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of hardship by being limited to a single forum, the 
Tohono Court observed that the plaintiff “could have filed in the CFC alone and if 
successful obtained monetary relief to compensate for any losses caused by the 
Government’s breach of duty.”27 
In another decision from the same term, United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Nation,28 the Court clarified the limits on tribal requests for information from the 
federal government, specifically rejecting common-law trust theories as a basis for 
demanding government documents.29 Indian breach of trust claims brought under 
the APA in District Court have been premised on a supposed independent cause of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See Brief for Respondent at 11, 34, 46, United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 
131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011) (No. 09-846) (arguing that the CFC cannot provide “full relief” 
because it cannot direct an accounting of tribal assets). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011) (resolving 
discovery dispute in ongoing Indian breach of trust litigation brought in CFC); Jicarilla 
Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 731–38 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (holding that 
tribal trust account statutes create a fiduciary duty by the government to the tribe). 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (2006). 
 22. 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011). 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1725, 1728.  
 25. Id. at 1727–31. 
 26. See infra Part III.B. 
 27. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1730–31. 
 28. 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011). 
 29. Id. at 2318, 2330. 
2013] JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS 87 
 
action for an accounting under the inherent equitable authority of the federal courts, 
a theory that is no longer viable after Jicarilla Apache.30 
In light of these judicial developments, attempted detours from the CFC in cases 
arising from monetary disputes with the federal government—in Indian breach of 
trust cases or otherwise—should be coming to an end.31 For example, but for the 
mistaken argument that District Courts have broader remedial powers in Indian 
breach of trust cases through inherent equitable authority, Native American tribes 
and individuals would have had less incentive to bypass the Tucker Act and Indian 
Tucker Act remedies available in the CFC, which include both money and 
collateral equitable-type relief.32 Indeed, the monetary and collateral relief authority 
of the CFC offers a fuller and richer set of remedies to Native Americans who 
establish breach by the United States of fiduciary duties, especially in contrast to 
the increasingly doubtful and limited accounting remedy in District Court. 
Accordingly, no reason remains to file parallel Indian breach of trust claims in both 
courts, either simultaneously or successively. 
With the exclusive jurisdictional authority of the CFC being confirmed directly 
and indirectly by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit for cases arising from 
what essentially are pecuniary disputes, this Article concludes that the § 1500 
problem has evaporated for many types of suits. For claims in which ultimate 
recovery of money from the United States is the essence, recent rulings in both the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit confirm that, when “[a]t bottom it is a suit 
for money,” then “the Court of Federal Claims can provide an adequate remedy, 
and it therefore belongs in that court.”33 
I. THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AND THE ADEQUACY OF MONEY JUDGMENTS 
A. The Court of Federal Claims and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Money Claims 
Against the United States 
What today is known as the United States Court of Federal Claims “shared its 
birth with that of the first significant grant of permission by the sovereign United 
States to its citizens to seek relief against it in the courts.”34 In 1855, Congress 
created the United States Court of Claims and gave it authority to hear claims 
against the United States founded upon federal statutes, regulations, and 
contracts.35 In 1887, the Tucker Act36 was enacted to confirm the nationwide 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over money claims (other than in tort) based on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 31. See infra Part III.B. 
 32. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 33. Suburban Mortg. Assocs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116, 
1118 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 34. GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 4.02(a)(1), at 226 
(4th ed. 2006). 
 35. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612. 
 36. Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505. 
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federal statutes, executive regulations, and contracts, while also expanding the 
court’s authority to include monetary actions based on the Constitution.37 
In 1982, through the Federal Courts Improvement Act,38 Congress divided the 
original Court of Claims into two related entities: (1) the Claims Court, which 
henceforth would serve as the trial forum for Tucker Act and certain other claims 
against the federal government, including government contract claims;39 and (2) the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which would be the 
appellate court with jurisdiction over Tucker Act case appeals generally and over 
cases from the Claims Court specifically.40 
The Claims Court was designated as an “Article I court”41—that is, a court 
created by Congress pursuant to its legislative powers under Article I of the 
Constitution and whose judges do not have the life-tenure protection guaranteed to 
members of the regular federal judiciary by Article III of the Constitution.42 
In 1992, the Claims Court was renamed the “United States Court of Federal 
Claims”43 (CFC), the denomination that it retains today. 
The Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute that also waives the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity from suit and authorizes monetary claims 
“founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of 
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United 
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”44 
Trial court jurisdiction over “Big” Tucker Act claims against the United States is 
assigned by § 1491(a)(1) to the CFC. District Courts retain concurrent jurisdiction 
over Tucker Act claims for $10,000 or less under § 1346(a)(2), which is commonly 
known as the “Little” Tucker Act.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Id. § 1. See generally Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate 
Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 
VILL. L. REV. 155, 176–77 (1998). 
 38. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). On the Federal Courts Improvement Act and 
the creation of the then-Claims Court, see generally Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of 
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 545, 585–87 
(2003). 
 39. See § 105(a), 96 Stat. at 26–28.  
 40. Id., §§ 127, 165, 96 Stat. at 37–38, 50. 
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2006). 
 42. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and 
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988). But see SISK, supra note 34, § 4.02(a)(3), at 231–
32 (arguing “that the Court of Federal Claims should be integrated more fully into the 
Judicial Branch by formally [being designated with] Article III status,” and that “[g]iven that 
a judge of the Court of Federal Claims upon expiration of his or her fifteen-year term may 
become a senior judge and thereby continue to act in a judicial capacity and receive a full 
salary, the court already has been given de facto Article III status by Congress”). 
 43. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 
4506, 4516 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 44. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (2006). 
 45. On the “Big” and “Little” Tucker Acts, see generally SISK, supra note 34, § 4.02(b), 
(c), at 236–39. 
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The Tucker Act remains the “foundation stone” in the adjudication of non-tort 
money claims against the United States.46 Congress has designated the CFC as the 
forum for demands against the public treasury, relying on its expertise with 
appropriations and other money-mandating statutes and its experience in 
adjudicating complex cases involving fiscal matters, financial transactions, and 
public monetary obligations.47 Among those matters falling under the purview of 
the CFC are government contract formation issues, military employment claims, 
Indian trust claims, vaccine claims, and takings of private property.48 
Traditionally, the CFC was understood to have authority to award only 
monetary relief against the United States.49 In recent decades, Congress has granted 
to the CFC meaningful and considerable, although limited, remedial powers 
beyond awarding a money judgment. Most importantly for present purposes, in 
1972, Congress enacted the Remand Act50 as an amendment to the Tucker Act, 
authorizing the CFC “[t]o provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief 
afforded by the judgment” by granting certain equitable-type relief attached to a 
money judgment, including “correction of applicable records.”51 Thus, when a 
plaintiff has a meritorious claim for a money judgment, the CFC also has the 
remedial power to grant certain non-monetary relief that is “incident of and 
collateral to” the money judgment.52 
Among the other matters on its diverse docket, the CFC long has served as 
Congress’s chosen forum for adjudicating financial and property disputes that arise 
from the nation’s responsibilities to indigenous peoples. In 1946, Congress enacted 
the Indian Tucker Act, which, as amended, directs the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the CFC— 
in favor of any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American 
Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United States or 
Alaska whenever such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws 
or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the President, or 
is one which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal 
Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.53 
With the enactment of the Indian Tucker Act, it would “never again be 
necessary to pass special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indians to 
secure a court adjudication on any misappropriations of Indian funds or of any 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. C. Stanley Dees, The Future of the Contract Disputes Act: Is It Time to Roll Back 
Sovereign Immunity?, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 545, 546 (1999). 
 47. See SISK, supra note 34, § 4.02(a)(4), at 235. 
 48. See id. at 232–36; Seamon, supra note 38, at 548–49. 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); United States v. Jones, 131 
U.S. 1, 9, 14–18 (1889). 
 50. Remand Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-415, 86 Stat. 652 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1491(a)(2) (2006)). 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). 
 52. Id. 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006) (originally enacted as the Indian Claims Commission Act, 
ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 24, 60 Stat. 1049, 1055 (1946)). 
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other Indian property by Federal officials that might occur in the future.”54 The 
Supreme Court’s landmark Indian breach of trust decisions over the decades have 
been rendered on review of claims originally filed in the CFC or its predecessors.55 
B. Jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims After the Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Bowen v. Massachusetts 
When considering amendments to the APA in 1976, Congress sought to pull 
together the “patchwork” of various statutory waivers of federal sovereign 
immunity in the hopes of regularizing this area of law and reducing confusion.56 By 
providing that the APA applies only to actions “seeking relief other than money 
damages”57 and where “there is no other adequate remedy in a court,”58 Congress 
designed the APA to be complementary with the Tucker Act—not overlapping or 
conflicting.59 In this way, as I have written previously, Congress has “woven a 
broad tapestry of authorized judicial actions against the federal government,” which 
“fit together into a reasonably well-integrated pattern of causes of action covering 
most subjects of dispute between the government and its citizens.”60 
In Bowen v. Massachusetts,61 decided in 1988, the Supreme Court allowed a 
singular type of plaintiff to bring a peculiar claim for monetary relief under the 
APA framework rather than under the purview of the Tucker Act. Many feared that 
the Court had thereby blurred the lines between the APA and the Tucker Act,62 
which is also the jurisdictional border between the District Courts and the CFC.63 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. 92 CONG. REC. 5313 (1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson). On the Indian Tucker Act 
and breach of trust claims, see generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 
5.05[1][b], at 426–33 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005 ed.); Gregory C. Sisk, Yesterday 
and Today: Of Indians, Breach of Trust, Money, and Sovereign Immunity, 39 TULSA L. REV. 
313, 316–17 (2003). 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 469 (2003); 
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 500 (2003); United States v. Mitchell, 463 
U.S. 206, 210 (1983); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 288–89 (1942). 
 56. See Massachusetts v. Departmental Grant Appeals Bd., 815 F.2d 778, 782–83 & n.3 
(1st Cir. 1987). 
 57. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
 58. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 59. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 11 (1976) (“The explicit exclusion of monetary relief 
[from the amendment to the APA leaves] . . . limitations on the recovery of money damages 
contained in . . . the Tucker Act . . . unaffected.”); see also Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table 
Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“When Congress amended section 
702 in 1976, it made it clear that it did not intend that amendment to have any effect on the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over suits for money damages falling within the 
jurisdiction of that court.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Claims Court at the Crossroads, 40 
CATH. U. L. REV. 517, 527 (1991) (“Congress clearly seems to have contemplated that there 
can be no suit in federal district court if the suit can instead be brought in the Claims Court 
under the Tucker Act.”). 
 60. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity 
and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 603 (2003). 
 61. 487 U.S. 879 (1988). 
 62. See, e.g., Marcia G. Madsen & Gregory A. Smith, The Court of Federal Claims in 
the 21st Century: Specific Proposals for Legislative Changes, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 
829–30 (2003) (describing Bowen as “upset[ting] . . . fundamental understandings” about 
CFC and District Court jurisdiction). For a detailed description and general critique of 
Bowen, see Sisk, supra note 60, at 618–27. 
 63. The APA does not provide an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to the 
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In dissent in Bowen, Justice Scalia feared that “the jurisdiction of the Claims 
Court has been thrown into chaos.”64 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit later observed that, through Bowen, “the barrier [between the 
APA/District Court and the Tucker Act/CFC] sprang a leak, a leak that has 
threatened to become a gusher.”65 
In Bowen, the Supreme Court examined a challenge filed by the State of 
Massachusetts in District Court to the federal government’s disallowance of a 
reimbursement for certain health care expenditures under the matching payment 
provisions of the Medicaid statute.66 The state invoked the authority of the District 
Court under the APA, to which the government objected by citing § 702, which 
explicitly excludes actions seeking “money damages.”67 The Supreme Court 
majority, however, held that the “money damages” exclusion in § 702 of the APA 
refers to claims seeking compensation for a loss.68 By contrast, the Bowen majority 
held that when money is “the very thing” to which a party is entitled,69 that money 
may be claimed in an action for specific relief under the APA: 
The State’s suit to enforce § 1396b(a) of the Medicaid Act, which 
provides that the Secretary “shall pay” certain amounts for appropriate 
Medicaid services, is not a suit seeking money in compensation for the 
damage sustained by the failure of the Federal Government to pay as 
mandated; rather, it is a suit seeking to enforce the statutory mandate 
itself, which happens to be one for the payment of money.70 
 In dissent in Bowen, Justice Scalia, joined by two other justices, relied on a 
distinction in the common law between a money judgment, which is “damages,” 
and a non-monetary prospective remedy, thus concluding that a claim for 
retrospective monetary relief falls outside the scope of the APA.71 Although leaving 
undisturbed the Bowen court’s narrow definition of “money damages” for purposes 
of § 702 of the APA, Justice Scalia subsequently incorporated the common-law 
approach into the majority opinion for the Court in Great-West Life & Annuity 
Insurance Co. v. Knudsen,72 a case arising under the Employment Retirement 
                                                                                                                 
federal courts. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 106–07 (1977). When a claim falls 
inside the scope of the APA’s limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity, then the general 
federal-question jurisdictional statute typically confers jurisdiction on the District Court. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).  
 64. 487 U.S. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65. Suburban Mortg. Assocs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116, 
1122 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 66. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v (2006). 
 67. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
 68. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 891–901. 
 69. Id. at 895. 
 70. Id. at 900 (emphasis in original); see also Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a 
“Specific” Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 131, 152 (2006) (explaining that because “the 
plaintiff had an original entitlement under [the] statute that the government pay money,” the 
Bowen Court “correctly decided that the monetary remedy the plaintiff sought was specific 
relief,” while maintaining that the author’s purpose was “not to question whether the 
Supreme Court in Bowen interpreted the APA correctly with respect to district court 
jurisdiction over challenges to agency action”). 
 71. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 913–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 72. 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
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Income Security Act (ERISA).73 In Great-West Life, Justice Scalia quoted from his 
Bowen dissent to reject a party’s characterization of a request for an injunction to 
pay money as “equitable relief” authorized under ERISA: 
Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, 
or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the 
plaintiff are suits for “money damages,” as that phrase has traditionally 
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss 
resulting from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.74 
In Bowen, the Court majority also rejected the government’s argument based on 
§ 704 of the APA, which authorizes judicial review under the APA only when 
“there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”75 The government contended that an 
alternative adequate remedy in the form of monetary relief was available against 
the United States in the then-Claims Court under the Tucker Act.76 Highlighting the 
special nature of the Medicaid financial participation arrangement between the 
federal government and the State of Massachusetts, the Court majority stated: 
[T]he nature of the controversies that give rise to disallowance 
decisions typically involve state governmental activities that a district 
court would be in a better position to understand and evaluate than a 
single tribunal headquartered in Washington. We have a settled and 
firm policy of deferring to regional courts of appeals in matters that 
involve the construction of state law. That policy applies with special 
force in this context because neither the Claims Court nor the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has any special expertise in considering 
the state-law aspects of the controversies that give rise to disallowances 
under grant-in-aid programs. It would be nothing less than remarkable 
to conclude that Congress intended judicial review of these complex 
questions of federal-state interaction to be reviewed in a specialized 
forum such as the Court of Claims.77 
Moreover, the Court found it “anomalous to assume that Congress would channel 
the review of compliance decisions to the regional courts of appeals . . . and yet 
intend that the same type of questions arising in the disallowance context should be 
resolved by the Claims Court or the Federal Circuit.”78 
On the § 704 “adequate remedy” exclusion, Justice Scalia dissented as well, 
saying that “even though a plaintiff may often prefer a judicial order enjoining a 
harmful act or omission before it occurs, damages after the fact are considered an 
‘adequate remedy’ in all but the most extraordinary cases.”79 He questioned the 
majority’s reasoning that a complex and ongoing federal-state relationship merited 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006). 
 74. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Bowen, 487 U.S. at 
918–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 75. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 76. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901–08. 
 77. Id. at 907–08. 
 78. Id. at 908 (internal citation omitted). 
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special consideration. Instead, Justice Scalia suggested that the area of law involved 
in the Medicaid program was no more complex than those subjects routinely 
handled in the then-Claims Court, that the federal government’s relationship with 
the states was not peculiarly intricate, and that the dispute was one of federal law 
that did not implicate state-law questions.80 
Whatever the merits of allowing APA review in district court in the federal-state 
Medicaid partnership context, the Bowen majority never suggested that the APA 
could be used to bypass the CFC for traditional money claims against the United 
States. Subsequently, in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox,81 the Court 
unanimously reversed the extension of Bowen by one Court of Appeals to allow a 
subcontractor on a federal project to impose an “equitable lien” on funds held by 
the United States.82 Holding that liens “are merely a means to the end of satisfying 
a claim for the recovery of money,” the Court held that this remedy fell within the 
exclusion under the APA of actions for “money damages.”83 Thus, the Court has 
recognized that lawsuits and remedial devices that traditionally have been designed 
to recover money should be recognized for what they are in substance—money 
claims. 
In essence, the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Massachusetts focused on a dispute 
over an ongoing public welfare program arising from a unique federal-state 
partnership relationship and held it was ill-suited for a Tucker Act suit in the CFC. 
The Court rejected what it called “the novel proposition that the Claims Court is the 
exclusive forum for judicial review” of Medicaid program disputes.84 Accordingly, 
as Professor Cynthia Grant Bowman and other scholars suggest, the “most likely 
interpretation” of Bowen is that it does not “transfer matters traditionally within the 
exclusive jurisdiction” of the CFC.85 
Writing nearly a decade ago, I characterized Bowen as “a notorious and 
remarkably far-reaching example” of a judicial decision that threatened to 
“unravel” the largely harmonious “tapestry” of statutes that authorized suits against 
the United States.86 Surveying the legal landscape at that time, from military and 
civilian employment claims to government contract and Indian trust claims—all 
matters that traditionally had fallen under the Tucker Act or related statutes in the 
CFC and outside of the APA in District Court—I worried aloud that the lower 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. Id. at 928–29. 
 81. 525 U.S. 255 (1999). 
 82. Id. at 261–64. 
 83. Id. at 262–63. 
 84. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 883. 
 85. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Bowen v. Massachusetts: The “Money Damages 
Exception” to the Administrative Procedure Act and Grant-in-Aid Litigation, 21 URB. LAW. 
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A. Lester, Defining Tucker Act Jurisdiction After Bowen v. Massachusetts, 40 CATH. U. L. 
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reimbursement”). 
 86. Sisk, supra note 60, at 603. 
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courts were falling into disarray, with Bowen “creating confusion and inconsistency 
and enhancing the opportunity for forum-shopping by litigants.”87 
Fortunately, as explained above and in the immediately following subsection of 
this Article, my worst fears that Bowen would be widely misapplied by lower 
courts to slowly dissolve CFC authority proved pessimistic. Decisions by both the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have reaffirmed the institutional integrity of 
the CFC over money claims and largely stabilized the jurisdictional doctrine.88 
Even in the specific field of Indian breach of trust claims, where the most marked 
departure from established jurisdictional rules had occurred in the District Court,89 
the Supreme Court now has arrested the flow of duplicative litigation in both the 
district court and CFC while emphasizing the fullness of the CFC monetary 
remedy.90 Together with the Federal Circuit’s continued clarification of Tucker Act 
jurisdiction and the adequacy of a money judgment to resolve financially centered 
disputes with the federal government, the stage has been set for a return of Indian 
breach of trust litigation to the CFC for complete adjudication with an ample set of 
remedies for the meritorious case.91 
In sum, the Supreme Court has never suggested that traditional Tucker Act 
claims—government contract disputes, military employment claims, or Indian 
breach of trust claims involving government management of assets—could be 
diverted from the CFC to the District Court as purported claims for specific relief 
under the APA. The Bowen court itself described the § 704 bar to judicial review in 
District Court when an “adequate remedy” lies elsewhere as “mak[ing] it clear that 
Congress did not intend the general grant of review in the APA to duplicate 
existing procedures for review of agency action.”92 For those types of claims that 
traditionally have fallen under the Tucker Act in the CFC an “adequate remedy” is 
available in the form of a money judgment and collateral equitable relief. For those 
claims the CFC has exclusive jurisdiction. 
C. The Federal Circuit’s Confirmation of Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Court of 
Federal Claims When a Money Judgment is Adequate 
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 
1982, Congress intended for it to exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over 
nontax Tucker Act claims in order “to provide reasonably quick and definitive 
answers to legal questions of nationwide significance.”93 Specifically, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(3) grants jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over all appeals from the 
Court of Federal Claims.94 Additionally, § 1295(a)(2) confers appellate jurisdiction 
upon the Federal Circuit over District Court decisions “if the jurisdiction of that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Id. at 606. 
 88. See supra Part I.B. and infra Part I.C. 
 89. See infra Part II.A. 
 90. See United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011). See generally 
infra Part III.B.2. 
 91. See infra Parts II.B.2, III.B.2.a–b. 
 92. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988). 
 93. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981). 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2006). 
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court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1346[(a)(2)] of this title,”95 that is, 
the Little Tucker Act. 
In United States v. Hohri,96 the Supreme Court examined the comprehensive 
framework of the Federal Circuit’s organic statute and noted the strong 
congressional expressions of the need for uniformity in the area of Tucker Act 
jurisprudence: 
A motivating concern of Congress in creating the Federal Circuit was 
the “special need for nationwide uniformity” in certain areas of the law. 
S. Rep. No. 97–275, p. 2 (1981) (hereinafter 1981 Senate Report); S. 
Rep. No. 96–304, p.8 (1979) (hereinafter 1979 Senate Report). The 
Senate Reports explained: “[T]here are areas of the law in which the 
appellate courts reach inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or in 
which—although the rule of law may be fairly clear—courts apply the 
law unevenly when faced with the facts of individual cases.” 1981 
Senate Report, at 3; 1979 Senate Report, at 9. The Federal Circuit was 
designed to provide “a prompt, definitive answer to legal questions” in 
these areas. 1981 Senate Report, at 1; 1979 Senate Report, at 1. Nontort 
claims against the Federal Government present one of the principal 
areas in which Congress sought such uniformity.97 
In 1988, in the immediate aftermath of and as a direct response to Bowen v. 
Massachusetts,98 Congress authorized a special interlocutory appeal to the Federal 
Circuit when what should be framed as a Tucker Act claim arguably has been mis-
filed in the District Court, thus potentially undermining the jurisdictional integrity 
of the CFC. In 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4), Congress granted a right to an immediate 
interlocutory appeal by either the plaintiff or the government from a District Court 
ruling “granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion to transfer an action to 
the United States Court of Federal Claims under” 28 U.S.C. § 1631.99 In this way, 
jurisdictional questions may be resolved at the outset of litigation, avoiding 
wasteful litigation on the merits in the wrong trial court. To “ensure uniform 
adjudication of Tucker Act issues in a single forum,” the interlocutory appeal is 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.100 
In a series of decisions, the Federal Circuit has emphasized “[r]espect for the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims” over monetary claims.101 In 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. Id. § 1295(a)(2). 
 96. 482 U.S. 64 (1987). 
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each of these cases, claimants against the United States sought to bypass the CFC 
by seeking injunctive or declaratory relief in District Court, even though the 
gravamen of the dispute was monetary and a money judgment would be an 
adequate remedy for a meritorious claim. Deprecating the post-Bowen v. 
Massachusetts development of “a sort of cottage industry among lawyers 
attempting to craft suits, ultimately seeking money from the Government, as suits 
for declaratory or injunctive relief without mentioning the money[,]”102 the Federal 
Circuit has stabilized the jurisdictional doctrine and reaffirmed the integrity of the 
CFC in claims ultimately grounded in a financial dispute with the United States.103 
First, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States Department of Energy,104 
nuclear utilities brought suit in District Court against the federal government 
challenging the constitutionality of statutory assessments against utilities for the 
government’s costs in decontaminating and decommissioning uranium processing 
facilities.105 The utilities sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was 
unconstitutional and an injunction against continued enforcement of the 
assessments.106 The government moved to transfer the case to the CFC, asserting 
that adequate relief in the form of a refund of prior assessments would be available 
through the Tucker Act if the plaintiff utilities were successful on the merits.107 
After the district court denied transfer and asserted authority under the APA, with 
citation to Bowen v. Massachusetts, the government took an interlocutory appeal to 
the Federal Circuit under § 1292(d)(4).108 
In Consolidated Edison, the Federal Circuit concluded that the CFC could offer 
an adequate remedy, thus depriving the District Court of authority under the 
APA.109 Although the nuclear utilities may have avoided the “money damages” 
exclusion in § 702 of the APA by seeking only prospective relief, the District Court 
nonetheless was deprived of jurisdiction under § 704 of the APA because the CFC 
was empowered to provide an effective remedy.110 If the utilities were successful in 
a suit for refund of previously paid assessments under the Tucker Act in the CFC, 
that judgment would operate by principles of res judicata to preclude the 
government from continuing unlawful assessments in the future. Thus, because 
“[r]elief from its retrospective obligations will also relieve it from the same 
obligations prospectively[,]” the CFC through a money judgment “can supply an 
adequate remedy even without an explicit grant of prospective relief.”111 The court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. Suburban Mortg. Assocs., v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 1116, 
1124 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 103. See Mary Ellen Coster Williams, 2007 Government Contract Decisions of the 
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 104. 247 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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 106. Id. at 1381. 
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 110. Id. at 1382–85. 
 111. Id. at 1384–85. 
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thus rejected the utilities’ “blatant forum shopping to avoid adequate remedies in an 
alternative forum.”112 
With respect to Bowen v. Massachusetts,113 the Federal Circuit in Consolidated 
Edison noted that the Supreme Court had “emphasized the complexity of the 
continuous relationship between the federal and state governments administering 
the Medicaid program.”114 The Federal Circuit explained that when a case does not 
involve “a complex ongoing federal-state interface,”115 the CFC can supply an 
adequate remedy through a money judgment.116 
Next, in Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States,117 the Federal Circuit 
confirmed its Consolidated Edison precedent, giving it further emphasis and 
broader reach. The Christopher Village court declared void a ruling by another 
Court of Appeals in the same case as having been issued without proper 
jurisdiction. Owners of a federally subsidized, low-income housing project 
challenged the government’s foreclosure of the federally insured mortgage on the 
property, which had substantially deteriorated, arguing that the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had breached contracts with the project 
by refusing to permit adequate rental increases.118 The plaintiffs filed suit in 
District Court under the APA seeking a declaratory judgment that the government 
was liable for breach of contract.119 After the District Court ruled in favor of the 
government, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, 
finding that the government had breached a contractual duty to entertain the request 
for rental increases.120 The plaintiffs then turned around and filed suit for damages 
in the Court of Federal Claims, presenting the Fifth Circuit’s ruling as establishing 
the existence of a breach as a matter of res judicata and thus leaving only the 
amount of damages to be determined.121 
On appeal from a summary judgment ruling for the government in the CFC, the 
Federal Circuit in Christopher Village reiterated that “a litigant’s ability to sue the 
government for money damages in the Court of Federal Claims is an ‘adequate 
remedy’ that precludes an APA waiver of sovereign immunity in other courts.”122 
The court confirmed its understanding that the Bowen v. Massachusetts decision, 
which permitted an action against the government involving a monetary dispute to 
proceed in District Court, was tied to the specific circumstances of that case—an 
ongoing matter with the potential for prospective relief involving the sensitive 
relationship between the federal and state governments.123 
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In Christopher Village, the Federal Circuit emphasized that a District Court does 
not have jurisdiction “to issue a declaratory judgment as to the government’s 
liability for breach of contract solely in order to create a ‘predicate’ for suit to 
recover damages in the Court of Federal Claims.”124 The court thereby rejected the 
relegation of the Court of Federal Claims into a paymaster certifying an award of 
damages as directed by another court. Because the District Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction in the prior related case (and thus that of the Fifth Circuit on appeal 
from that court) infringed upon the authority of another tribunal (the CFC), the 
Federal Circuit ruled in Christopher Village that neither it nor the CFC were bound 
to follow the earlier judgment in any respect.125 
In Suburban Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development,126 the Federal Circuit confirmed that if the plaintiff’s 
claim, however framed, actually seeks a monetary reward from the government, 
such that a judgment in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act will give 
the plaintiff essentially the remedy he seeks, then the CFC is the only proper forum. 
In Suburban Mortgage, a lender sought to assign a note and mortgage, on which a 
nursing home had defaulted, to HUD under a federal mortgage guarantee 
program.127 Because the government asserted fraud, given that the same individual 
allegedly owned or controlled both the lender and the nursing home, HUD refused 
to accept the assignment.128 
The lender filed suit in District Court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, the APA, and the Declaratory Judgment Act.129 Essentially, the lender 
sought a declaratory judgment or specific performance on the mortgage guarantee 
agreement with HUD—that is, an order to HUD to accept assignment of the note 
and mortgage. The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction or alternatively for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to the CFC, 
contending that the suit was a contract action under the Tucker Act.130 The District 
Court ruled that the lender’s claim was permissible under the APA as a request for 
specific relief in the form of money, citing to Bowen v. Massachusetts, and further 
that the CFC could not provide an adequate remedy because injunctive relief was 
necessary to redress the lender’s concerns about possible bankruptcy, loss of 
reputation, and loss of future profits.131 
On interlocutory appeal in Suburban Mortgage, the Federal Circuit rejected this 
attempt at an end-run around both the Tucker Act and the Court of Federal 
Claims.132 To “thwart such attempted forum shopping,”133 the court explained that 
if the substance of the claim is one for money, then the Tucker Act remedy in the 
Court of Federal Claims is presumptively adequate.134 Accordingly, the District 
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Court lacked authority under § 704 of the APA (whether or not this type of 
monetary relief fell under the “money damages” exclusion in § 702 of the APA).135 
In the case at hand, the Federal Circuit had little difficulty concluding that the 
lender, in essence, was seeking the financial benefit of the agreement with HUD 
under the mortgage-guarantee contract. 
The lender in Suburban Mortgage insisted that the CFC remedy was inadequate, 
because the CFC could not grant equitable relief. But the Federal Circuit reiterated 
its understanding from Consolidated Edison and Christopher Village that the 
Bowen v. Massachusetts adequacy of remedy holding turned on the complexity of a 
continuous relationship between two sovereigns—the United States and the State of 
Massachusetts.136 The Suburban Mortgage case involved no complex or even 
ongoing relationship.137 Moreover, any money judgment entered by the CFC would 
control the government’s future related behavior through principles of collateral 
estoppel.138 The Federal Circuit concluded the opinion by reminding the District 
Courts around the country that when it comes to the Tucker Act, the court that 
ultimately may decide the matter is the Federal Circuit.139 Thus, while District 
Courts properly look to the law of the regional circuits for guidance, they may be 
well-advised to pay attention to the precedent of the Federal Circuit as well.140 
The Federal Circuit’s most recent ruling on the contours of CFC jurisdiction in a 
rather idiosyncratic context reflects no retreat from those earlier decisions that had 
emphasized the primacy of the CFC over money claims against the United States. 
In Nebraska Public Power District v. United States (NPPD),141 the Federal Circuit 
sitting en banc held that review by the D.C. Circuit under the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1982142 of the Department of Energy’s failure to establish a repository site 
for spent nuclear fuel did not encroach on the jurisdiction of the CFC.143 The 
Federal Circuit reached this conclusion even though the D.C. Circuit also issued a 
writ of mandamus directing the process of contractual remedies for nuclear utilities 
that had contracted with the Department to accept spent nuclear fuel.144 
Critics of the NPPD decision fear that it “has the potential to reshape the 
jurisdictional landscape significantly by further diminishing the CFC’s exclusive 
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jurisdiction.”145 Whenever “statutory provisions influence the interpretation of the 
government contracts they authorize,” Daniel Thies warns that “[c]reative lawyers” 
may seek statutory review in other federal courts, thereby undermining the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CFC over government contracts.146 Judge Gajarsa 
dissented in NPPD, viewing the approval of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling as 
“infring[ing] upon the Court of Federal Claims’s exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction 
over the administration of contract disputes, thereby impacting the sovereign 
immunity of the United States and undermining this court’s duty to review the 
contract decisions of the Court of Federal Claims.”147 Given that agency statutes 
sometimes include special jurisdictional provisions for particular matters,148 broad 
interpretation of such jurisdictional statutes to encompass contractual or money 
damages matters could progressively erode the CFC’s Tucker Act jurisdiction. 
Whatever the merits of the Federal Circuit’s particular analysis in NPPD, the 
court’s ruling is grounded in the singular and complicated nuclear waste legislation, 
which includes a specific jurisdictional provision for review in the regional Court 
of Appeals of the department’s actions regarding a repository for spent nuclear 
fuel.149 The Federal Circuit emphasized that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on contractual 
remedies was merely an “implementation of its statutory ruling”150 and “did not 
impermissibly invade the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.”151 
Importantly, all members of the en banc Federal Circuit in NPPD—the majority, 
the concurrence, and the dissent—affirmed the continued force of the landmark 
Consolidated Edison and Christopher Village decisions, even though the judges 
disagreed on the application of those precedents to the unique context of review 
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.152 
In sum, as the Federal Circuit has consistently confirmed, when a retrospective 
monetary remedy is available, it is “adequate” absent extraordinary circumstances, 
notwithstanding the unavailability of prospective or equitable remedies. Any 
judgment by the CFC awarding monetary relief for past breaches of a duty will 
deter the federal government from repeating that conduct in the future, both as a 
matter of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) as to the particular litigants and as a 
matter of precedent as to other concerned entities, especially if the CFC judgment 
is reviewed by the Federal Circuit which has nationwide appellate jurisdiction and 
thus can establish Tucker Act jurisprudence with nationwide precedential effect. 
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II. DISTRICT COURT V. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS: THE JURISDICTIONAL TUG-OF-
WAR IN INDIAN BREACH OF TRUST CLAIMS 
A. The Unprecedented Projection of District Court Authority Over Money Disputes 
in Cobell v. Babbitt 
In 1996, a class action lawsuit on behalf of more than 300,000 Native 
Americans was filed as Cobell v. Babbitt in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia, alleging that the United States had failed to account for billions of 
dollars earned on oil and logging leases of millions of acres of land allotted to 
American Indians over a century ago but held in trust by the federal government.153 
When the government, during discovery, failed to turn over records for Indian trust 
accounts promised by Department of Justice lawyers, the district judge took the 
extraordinary step of holding several leading officials, including the Secretary of 
the Interior, in contempt.154 
 After a bench trial in 1999, the District Court found that the government had 
kept such poor records that it was incapable of determining what it owed each 
individual Native American or, for that matter, even which individuals owned 
which allotments of land.155 The court concluded: 
The United States’ mismanagement of the [Individual Indian Money] 
trust is far more inexcusable than garden-variety trust mismanagement 
of a typical donative trust. For the beneficiaries of this trust did not 
voluntarily choose to have their lands taken from them; they did not 
willingly relinquish pervasive control of their money to the United 
States. The United States imposed this trust on the Indian people.156 
The District Court retained continuing jurisdiction over the matter, including 
periodic review of the government’s ongoing efforts to prepare a full historical 
accounting of the trust.157 
In 2002, still dissatisfied with the progress of the Department of Interior in 
performing an historical accounting of allotment accounts, the district judge issued 
a new contempt citation to another cabinet secretary in a new administration, based 
upon findings of deception and abject failure in continuing efforts to reform the 
trust system.158 However, on this occasion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that the district judge had overstepped his 
authority, reversing the contempt citation as improperly holding the Secretary 
responsible for the conduct of her predecessor in office and rejecting the finding 
that the secretary had committed fraud on the court through deceptive status 
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reports.159 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the District Court had clearly erred 
in reappointing a monitor who had been invested “with wide-ranging extrajudicial 
duties over the Government’s objection.”160 
At this point, Congress intervened by enacting legislation to temporarily relieve 
the Department of Interior from conducting the expensive and burdensome 
historical accounting ordered by the District Court in Cobell—legislation that the 
D.C. Circuit upheld on appeal as constitutional161—while Congress sought to 
develop a comprehensive legislative solution to the trust account problem. When 
that legislative suspension expired by its own terms at the end of 2004 without 
congressional resolution, the district judge characterized the congressional action as 
“a bizarre and futile attempt at legislating a settlement of this case,”162 promptly 
reinstated the structural injunction ordering the government to conduct a complete 
historical accounting of the trust fund accounts, and announced the intention to 
conduct further contempt proceedings related to the case.163 
In 2006, the D.C. Circuit reversed additional orders by the district judge as 
exceeding judicial authority and then punctuated its ruling by ordering the action 
assigned to a different judge.164 The D.C. Circuit ruled that the district judge had 
“exceeded the role of impartial arbiter,” had leveled serious charges against Interior 
and its officials unrelated to the issue before the court, and had become so extreme 
in “professed hostility to Interior” as to display a clear inability to render a fair 
judgment.165 In 2009, the D.C. Circuit once again overturned the District Court, 
which through a new judge had concluded that an accounting was not possible and 
had instead ordered payment by the government of $455 million as a “restitutionary 
award.”166 
Finally, in December 2010, Congress approved a $3.4 billion settlement that had 
been reached between the parties, of which $1.4 billion would compensate Indian 
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trust account beneficiaries for their trust mismanagement claims.167 The settlement 
was finalized by the District Court in July 2011.168  
Even at its close, the case engendered controversy, when the Cobell plaintiffs’ 
attorneys asked the District Court to award $223 million in fees to be paid from the 
settlement,169 despite having signed a settlement agreement (which was presented 
to Congress in asking for legislative approval of the overall settlement) in which 
plaintiffs agreed that they “shall not assert that Class Counsel be paid more than 
$99,900,000.00.”170 Given that most individual Native American beneficiaries of 
the settlement would receive less than $2,000,171 the fee request drew sharp 
criticism from many Native Americans. The National Congress of American 
Indians adopted a resolution supporting new legislation to cap the fees at $50 
million in the Cobell case and declaring that the $223 million sought by the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers “is considered outrageous by many in Indian Country and as a 
breach of their fiduciary duty to the class by putting their own interests ahead of the 
class, and has resulted in intense bipartisan scrutiny and criticism.”172 In the end, 
the District Court approved fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys of $99 million.173 
As I have said previously about Cobell,  
[s]omewhat lost in the story of egregious government misconduct and 
adjudication of high-ranking government officials in contempt is the 
fact that the jurisdiction of the District Court—rather than the Court of 
Federal Claims—over the entire matter was doubtful and only possible 
through a generous reading of the Bowen v. Massachusetts decision.174  
Indeed, the course of the litigation and its ultimate resolution confirm that the case 
always was about money—how the United States was obliged as a fiduciary to 
manage Indian money accounts, how the government mishandled funds held in 
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trust, and how much the government should pay to restore funds to those accounts 
and compensate for its failures. 
From the beginning, the District Court in Cobell asserted authority over the 
matter under the APA, claiming the power to grant retrospective relief in the nature 
of an historical accounting of the accrued, past-due sums of money that should be 
present in individual Indian trust accounts. Quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, the 
court said that the plaintiffs sought “‘the very thing to which they are entitled,’ an 
accounting of their money that actually exists in the [Individual Indian Money] 
trust.”175 In a terse paragraph, the D.C. Circuit later upheld this holding, with 
citation to Bowen, by ruling that the plaintiffs’ request for an accounting constituted 
“specific relief other than money damages” which the district court had authority to 
hear under the APA.176 
Turning away the argument that the case belonged in the Court of Federal 
Claims as a money judgment claim under the Tucker Act, the District Court in 
Cobell said that the “crucial issue” was “whether the plaintiffs’ requested 
retrospective remedy of an accounting is an equitable, specific claim, or whether it 
is simply a money damages claim in disguise.”177 Faced with questions about the 
amenability of the APA for their Indian breach of trust suit, the plaintiffs belatedly 
denied that they were asking for any “cash infusion” into the accounts “to 
recompense the plaintiffs for lost or mismanaged funds”178 and “disavowed seeking 
an order for the payment of money in this case.”179 Because the complaint actually 
had sought broad financial relief, the District Court performed cosmetic surgery to 
strike from the complaint those allegations that explicitly sought monetary relief 
beyond the parameters of the APA.180 “At most,” the District Court concluded, “the 
enforcement of this statutory right [to an accounting] may partially support some 
future monetary claim (but not necessarily ‘money damages’), which, because this 
is plaintiffs’ own money, will only be compensatory to the extent that the money is 
missing from the trust.”181 
Writing nearly a decade ago, I maintained that the Cobell case ultimately was 
about money and, therefore, belonged in the Court of Federal Claims: 
The Cobell plaintiffs did not seek an accounting from the government 
because they value bookkeeping exactitude in the abstract or appreciate 
the intrinsic beauty of a well-prepared financial statement. Rather, they 
sought an accounting for the practical purpose of hastening the day that 
the government will be called to account for—that is, required to pay—
the money that it has wrongfully withheld.182 
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Like the “equitable lien” device that the Supreme Court refused to countenance 
under the APA in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,183 the accounting of 
Native American trust accounts requested in Cobell was “merely a means to the 
end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money.”184 
Time has served only to confirm that portrayal. 
In the beginning, as the Cobell lawsuit got underway, the District Court declared 
that there was no evidence that the true nature of the plaintiffs’ claims was to obtain 
eventual monetary reimbursement.185 Accepting the plaintiffs’ assertions that they 
sought no payment of money and no infusion of cash into Indian trust accounts, the 
Cobell court proclaimed that “[t]hese facts belie any claim that the plaintiffs’ 
requested remedy is for money damages.”186 
In the end, however, with resolution of the litigation by the $3.4 billion 
settlement, the underlying pecuniary nature of the case became transparent. What 
the plaintiffs had repeatedly insisted they were not seeking—any cash infusion into 
the accounts or any order for the payment of money—proved to be exactly what the 
plaintiffs sought and received. Indeed, in the plaintiffs’ petition for an award of 
attorney’s fees as part of the final settlement of the Cobell case, they forthrightly 
relied on “[t]he size of the fund and number of class members benefited” to justify 
a request for $223 million in attorney’s fees, characterizing “the $3.4 billion 
settlement [as] the largest class action award against the government.”187 
Moreover, although little noticed inside the legislation approving the Cobell 
settlement, the parties apparently recognized and took extraordinary steps to 
address the possible jurisdictional infirmity of the Cobell litigation, effectively 
conceding that the claim truly was one that otherwise would fall under the Tucker 
Act. In legislative language proposed by the parties and enacted by Congress, the 
Claims Resolution Act of 2010 provides that “[n]otwithstanding the limitation on 
the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States in section 1346(a)(2) of 
title 28, United States Code, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia shall have jurisdiction of the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint 
for purposes of the Settlement.”188 The reference to § 1346(a)(2) is to the Little 
Tucker Act,189 which allows claims for money judgments in the District Court only 
up to $10,000, while claims above $10,000 must be pursued in the CFC. 
In this way, the settlement legislation acknowledges that the Cobell requests for 
relief under the settlement sought a money judgment under the Tucker Act, and the 
legislation then lifts the $10,000 limit on Tucker Act claims in District Court for 
this particular lawsuit.190 Notably, no pretense was made in the final resolution of 
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the Cobell litigation that the monetary relief authorized by the special settlement 
statute could properly have been obtained within the parameters of the APA. 
Thus, the Cobell lawsuit itself came to an end with a congressionally enacted 
jurisdictional reprieve, but one limited to that litigation. It was a legislative ticket 
good for the Cobell ride only. Unfortunately, in the decade since the original Cobell 
jurisdictional rulings, a growing number of other plaintiffs have tried to get on the 
District Court train for Indian breach of trust claims.191 Through “an unprecedented 
projection of District Court authority into the province of the Court of Federal 
Claims over money-based claims by Indians against the United States,”192 the 
Cobell decision set the stage for forum shopping, clever pleading of money claims 
as requests for equitable relief, jurisdictional confusion, and duplicative litigation. 
These parallel lawsuits led to a collision between the Court of Federal Claims and 
the District Court that eventually landed in the Supreme Court.193 
B. The Adequacy of Remedies in the Court of Federal Claims and the District 
Court in Indian Breach of Trust Cases 
1. Tucker Act and Indian Tucker Act Suits in the Court of Federal Claims for 
Breach of Trust 
While individual Native American and tribal claimants may pursue 
constitutional and statutory claims for money under the Tucker Act in the same 
manner as others, the historical guardian-ward relationship between the federal 
government and indigenous peoples may give rise to a “breach of trust” cause of 
action.194 When a genuine fiduciary relationship between the United States and an 
Indian tribe or individual American Indian is confirmed with respect to a particular 
category of Indian assets or resources, the Tucker Act195 or Indian Tucker Act196 
authorize an action for money damages in the Court of Federal Claims. 
In United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,197 the Supreme Court 
explained that, although an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity is a 
predicate to any suit against the United States, the Tucker Act and the companion 
Indian Tucker Act operate to provide such consent.198 Because the Tucker Act does 
not create a cause of action, the plaintiff must premise the substantive right on a 
statute or regulation that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by 
the Federal Government for the damage sustained.”199 The pertinent statute or 
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regulation need only “be reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a 
right of recovery in damages”; that is, “a fair inference will do.”200 
Neither the general trust relationship that historically existed between the United 
States and the Indian peoples nor the common law of trust alone can give rise to the 
type of fiduciary relationship that is enforceable by judicial action through the 
Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act. A statutory- or regulatory-created fiduciary 
relationship remains indispensable to inferring a right to sue for breach of trust.201 
In looking for a substantive right in an Indian breach of trust case under the Tucker 
Act, the Supreme Court in United States v. Navajo Nation202 said that “the analysis 
must train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory 
prescriptions.”203 
However, in some contrast with ordinary Tucker Act claims,204 once a statutory- 
or regulatory-based fiduciary relationship is identified between the United States 
and Native Americans, the statutory or regulatory “prescriptions need not . . . 
expressly provide for money damages; the availability of such damages may be 
inferred.”205 Once the statutory “focus” of a specific fiduciary duty has been 
provided, then, as the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. White Mountain 
Apache Tribe,206 the “general trust law [is to be] considered in drawing the 
inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a breach of obligation.”207 To 
demand an express statutory reference to money damages as the available remedy, 
the Court concluded, “would read the trust relation out of Indian Tucker Act 
analysis.”208 
Because, as I have described it previously, “a Native American claim for breach 
of trust against the federal government must be constructed upon a statutory 
foundation,”209 successful claims typically arise from statutes that describe 
pervasive government control over, and establish management rules for, particular 
assets or resources that are being held in trust for individual Indians or tribes. Thus, 
in White Mountain Apache, the governing statute not only stated that the Fort 
Apache site would be held in trust for the tribe but granted discretion to the 
government to use the property, which the government had exercised by assuming 
“plenary” control through daily occupation.210 In United States v. Mitchell,211 the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. Id. at 473. 
 201. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983) (holding that congressional 
enactments or administrative regulations must be adduced to “establish a fiduciary 
relationship and define the contours of the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities”). 
 202. 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 203. Id. at 506. 
 204. See Sisk, supra note 54, at 340 (explaining that, in regular Tucker Act cases outside 
the fiduciary context of Indian breach of trust claims, “while the statute need not authorize 
judicial action or even contemplate the prospect of litigation—the Tucker Act expressly 
creates the right to file suit—the statute must speak in the dialect of lucre”). 
 205. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 506. 
 206. 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
 207. Id. at 477. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Sisk, supra note 54, at 344. 
 210. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 475. 
 211. 463 U.S. 206 (1983). 
108 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:83 
 
pertinent statute was held to impose fiduciary duties on the United States with 
respect to timber harvesting on Indian lands because the government, by statute, 
had “assume[d] such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to 
Indians.”212 
When, however, the governing statute instead evidences a purpose to “yield[] 
management, supervision, and possession of Native American resources, and 
thereby restor[e] autonomous and independent control to the tribe or individual 
property owners,” then, as I have explained, “the governmental fiduciary role fades 
accordingly.”213 In Navajo Nation, for example, the Court found that the Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act214 was designed “to enhance tribal self-determination,” giving 
the primary power to negotiate and transact coal mining leases to the tribes.215 
Thus, a particular statutory policy of encouraging Indian self-determination, 
together with withdrawal of government possession and management, tends to 
contradict an inference of a fiduciary responsibility on the part of the United States, 
enforceable by a damages remedy.216 
In addition to statutes and regulations creating trust duties for the United States 
with respect to management of natural resources, a fiduciary duty creating an 
inference of a Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act remedy may arise from statutes 
prescribing governmental duties in receiving, holding, investing, and distributing 
funds for individual Indians or tribes. Statutes such as the American Indian Trust 
Fund Management Reform Act of 1994,217 which imposes certain duties on the 
United States in managing, investing, and accounting for funds “held in trust by the 
United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe or an individual Indian,”218 and the 
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982,219 which applies to 
royalties on oil or gas leases on Indian lands, do not create an express right of 
action in court for breach of these duties or provide that violation of the statutory 
terms should be compensated by damages. Again, however, that is where the 
Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act come into play, by allowing inference of a 
cause of action for breach of trust that may be remedied by a money judgment in 
the Court of Federal Claims. 
Given the express statutory provision that the funds are held in trust, the 
pervasive control of the government over the funds, and the specific statutory 
directions as to how funds are to be managed, invested, and accounted for, a 
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fiduciary relationship plainly exists with respect to these tribal and individual 
Indian trust accounts.220 Given further that mishandling of funds almost invariably 
will result in loss of funds from the accounts of those to whom they belong and 
additional loss of the investment value of those funds, a breach of these fiduciary 
duties by the United States would state a claim under the Tucker Act and the Indian 
Tucker Act.221 Because it is doubtful that an allegation of breach of trust of these 
statutory fiduciary duties with respect to money accounts could arise without the 
fact of retrospective financial harm, a money judgment remedy is not only 
available, but provides an adequate remedy within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
CFC.222 
2. The Adequacy of a Money Judgment (and Collateral Relief) in the Court of 
Federal Claims in Indian Breach of Trust Cases 
The Supreme Court long has recognized the adequacy of a money judgment to 
remedy a meritorious claim of breach of trust by the government in its fiduciary 
responsibilities in managing Native American assets and resources. In United 
States v. Mitchell,223 an Indian breach of trust case involving government 
management of Indian timber resources, the Court described the Tucker Act 
remedy in the Court of Federal Claims as, not merely adequate, but superior to the 
alternative of a suit for specific relief in the District Court under the  APA. As the 
Court observed, a Tucker Act suit for retrospective damages caused by the 
government’s breach of its fiduciary duty to manage resources held in trust is 
essential because prospective remedies available under the APA would be “totally 
inadequate” in deterring government mismanagement and ensuring that Native 
Americans receive the proper value of the managed resources.224 
In clarifying the state of the law pursuant to its national appellate jurisdiction 
over Tucker Act matters,225 the Federal Circuit has specifically noted its 
disagreement with the federal courts in the District of Columbia on the proper 
jurisdictional venue for Indian breach of trust claims involving mishandling of 
funds in individual and tribal accounts. In Eastern Shawnee Tribe v. United 
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States,226 the Federal Circuit referred to the D.C. Circuit’s Cobell decision227 and 
then said:  
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit—we think incorrectly—has nonetheless held that §§ 702 and 
704 of the APA do not bar a suit in the district court for an equitable 
accounting and the award of monetary relief, though it has agreed that 
some forms of monetary relief are unavailable in the district court and 
must be sought in the Court of Federal Claims.228 
a. Money Judgment for Indian Breach of Trust Claims 
When an individual Native American or tribe has suffered past monetary loss as 
a result of a governmental breach of trust, a claim for a retrospective money 
judgment will remedy that harm. To be sure, the trust doctrine applies to disputes 
about governmental trust responsibilities beyond management of Native American 
resources and funds. Breach of trust may be alleged as a non-monetary claim for 
specific relief when the harm caused by the government’s misconduct or dereliction 
of duty does not translate directly into economic terms and monetary relief is not 
sought.229 Moreover, when the harm has not yet been realized and the claim is 
wholly forward-looking in effect, a claim for a money judgment would be 
premature. 
In theory, perhaps, if supported by statutory authority and pursued under the 
APA, a request for an equitable accounting of Indian accounts or assets managed in 
trust by the federal government might be presented divorced from any pecuniary 
element if no economic harm has yet occurred or is entirely speculative. As a 
practical matter, however, an Indian trust dispute involving government 
management of tribal assets or funds will rarely, if ever, arise separately from 
existing financial injury.  
In both the Cobell230 and post-Cobell litigation in the District Court, Native 
American plaintiffs alleged a breach of trust with already-suffered financial 
consequences. Consider, for example, the Tohono O’odham Nation’s lawsuit in 
District Court regarding the United States’ management of tribal trust fund 
accounts, which later became the subject of a jurisdictional collision because of 
duplicative litigation in the CFC.231 In that case, the Nation began its complaint by 
alleging “breaches of trust by the United States . . . in the management and 
accounting of trust assets, including funds and lands.”232 In the first paragraph of its 
District Court complaint, the Nation sought not only an accounting but also the 
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“correct[ion of] the balances of the Nation’s trust fund accounts to reflect accurate 
balances.”233 Indeed, the Nation asked the District Court for remedies of 
“disgorgement” and “equitable restitution,”234 that is, a transfer of money from the 
federal government to the Nation. 
When the Tohono O’odham Nation’s filing of simultaneous lawsuits in both the 
District Court and the CFC later was questioned before the Supreme Court,235 the 
Nation attempted to distinguish the monetary relief sought in the two lawsuits. The 
Nation contended that the complaint in District Court sought “the return of ‘old 
money’ that belongs to the Nation but erroneously does not appear on its balance 
sheet”;236 that is, an infusion of cash if an equitable accounting showed that funds 
were missing from accounts. By contrast, the Nation insisted, its complaint in the 
CFC sought “damages in the form of ‘new money’ that the Nation should have 
earned as profit but did not”;237 that is, the financial consequences of lost 
investment opportunities. 
In considering the adequacy of a money judgment under the Tucker Act or the 
Indian Tucker Act, however, purported distinctions between “particular pots of 
money as different relief”238 are distinctions without a difference.239 As the 
Supreme Court clarified in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. 
Knudson,240 when a plaintiff seeks a supposed “restitution” remedy “‘to obtain a 
judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of 
money,’” the claim is a legal one not substantively different from a claim for 
ordinary damages.241 For that reason, as Professor Nora Pasman-Green and attorney 
Alexis Derrossett explain, “most restitution claims result in a money judgment, 
which is satisfied by the same enforcement procedures as a damage award.”242 
In any event, the CFC’s authority under the Tucker Act does not turn on such 
dichotomies as old versus new money, equitable versus legal remedies, money 
“damages” versus other monetary relief, or specific versus substitutionary relief.243 
                                                                                                                 
 
 233. Id. at 2. 
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Part II.B.3.d. 
 235. See infra Part III.A. 
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“hairsplitting”). 
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 243. Cf. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1733 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
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the United States in 28 U.S.C. § 1500, that “[t]he formal label affixed to the form of relief 
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Plainly and simply, the CFC may award money, without respect to label.244 If a 
substantive right to action authorizes payment, the CFC has the power under the 
Tucker Act and Indian Tucker Act to enter a money judgment. As the CFC held 
with respect to the parallel Tohono O’odham Nation litigation in that forum, “in 
this court, no distinction is to be found between money ‘old’ and ‘new.’ Rather, if 
successful, a plaintiff is made whole, to the extent possible, by the payment of 
money for the government's breaches of trust.”245 
When a retrospective monetary remedy is available, it is “adequate” absent 
extraordinary circumstances, notwithstanding the unavailability of prospective or 
equitable remedies. “[A]sking for ‘more’ relief where monetary relief will satisfy 
the claimant’s needs cannot defeat the jurisdictional scheme set up by Congress—
to centralize money claims against the government, except those claims under 
$10,000 and those sounding in tort, in the [Court of Federal Claims].”246 
And, as noted, Native American plaintiffs bringing suit for breach of trust 
invariably do so because they already have suffered financial harm—the fact of real 
and present injury is what prompts the tribe or individual to resort to litigation. 
b. Collateral Relief (Including Accounting Equivalent) 
Under the Remand Act of 1972, “[t]o provide an entire remedy and to complete 
the relief afforded by the judgment,” the CFC has authority “as an incident of and 
collateral to any such judgment” to “issue orders directing . . . correction of 
applicable records . . . to any appropriate official of the United States.”247 
Moreover, “[i]n any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the power to 
remand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or official with 
such direction as it may deem proper and just.”248 When this amendment to the 
Tucker Act was enacted, the House report explained: “[W]hen the Court of Claims 
does have jurisdiction over any case before it, this bill will enable the court to grant 
all necessary relief in one action.”249 
Through this statutory grant of limited equitable-type powers, the CFC may both 
award a money judgment for mismanagement of Native American resources and, 
incident and collateral to that money judgment, order correction of the financial 
records and trust accounts maintained by the government, either directly or by 
                                                                                                                 
money to remedy the Government’s alleged failure to keep accurate accounts”). 
 244. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 900–01 n.31 (1988) (explaining that, 
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remanding the matter to the appropriate agency to reconcile trust accounts. As the 
Federal Circuit has observed in dicta, the CFC “appears to have the authority to 
order an equitable accounting as ancillary relief.”250 
In United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,251 a majority of the Supreme Court 
turned aside the Nation’s claimed hardship of being precluded from filing 
simultaneous claims in District Court (for an accounting) and in the Court of 
Federal Claims (for a money judgment) by observing that the Nation “could have 
filed in the CFC alone and if successful obtained monetary relief to compensate for 
any losses caused by the Government’s breach of duty.”252 The concurring Justices 
in Tohono O’odham Nation responded that “the CFC has held that it lacks 
jurisdiction to issue a preliability accounting.”253 The concurrence’s response is 
correct as far as it goes—the CFC’s authority to grant collateral equitable-type 
relief is triggered only by an underlying claim of past-due monetary liability under 
the Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act. However, the allegation of a breach of trust 
arising from an enforceable fiduciary relationship typically transfigures a claim 
from a preliability to a postliability one, that is, from a purely prospective to a 
retrospective allegation. 
As explained above, as a practical matter, Indian breach of trust suits involving 
government mismanagement of Native American assets invariably are or could be 
premised on past harm giving rise to monetary liability, rather than posing abstract 
future-looking claims divorced from existing financial injury. Notably, the Tohono 
O’odham Nation concurrence followed its statement with a “but see” citation to the 
Federal Circuit’s suggestion that an equitable accounting may be ordered as 
collateral relief under the Remand Act.254 
Even prior to the 1972 congressional grant of additional remedial authority 
ancillary to a money judgment, the CFC always had “the power to require an 
accounting in aid of its jurisdiction to render a money judgment on that claim.”255 
Likewise, discovery in the CFC has always been available to secure government 
documents and records relevant to the claim.256 
Although supplemental to a monetary remedy, the CFC’s power to demand a 
complete, detailed, and accurate accounting (or its equivalent) of Indian assets that 
are the subject of a breach of trust claim should not be doubted. (In any event, the 
APA does not remain available in the District Court whenever the alternative 
                                                                                                                 
 
 250. E. Shawnee Tribe v. United States, 582 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also 
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114 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:83 
 
remedy afforded by Congress in another court is imperfect, awkward, or less than 
comprehensive; rather, § 704 withdraws the power of judicial review under the 
APA when the alternative remedy in another court for a general class of claimants 
is “adequate.”257) In sum, when an individual American Indian or tribe presents a 
meritorious claim of breach of trust by the United States, that claim can be 
adequately remedied by a money judgment and collateral relief available in the 
CFC under the Tucker Act and Indian Tucker Act. 
3. The Availability and Scope of a Claim for an Accounting and Equitable 
Remedies in Indian Breach of Trust Cases in the District Court 
Even aside from the exclusion of claims for money damages under § 702 and 
the withdrawal of judicial review when an adequate remedy lies in another court 
under § 704, the APA is an uncertain, and at best limited, source of authority for 
relief in Indian breach of trust cases involving mismanagement of assets, such as 
tribal funds. In particular, a private right of action (if any exists) requiring the 
United States to prepare an accounting of Indian trust assets is now likely limited to 
obtaining information as specifically prescribed by statute (along with perhaps a 
basic reconciliation of account statements). Additional remedies such as restitution 
for monies missing from trust accounts are almost certainly outside the parameters 
of the APA. 
In the Cobell litigation,258 which opened the door to Indian breach of trust 
claims in District Court, the plaintiffs initially framed their claim for an accounting 
of Indian trust accounts as falling under the APA, both as a waiver of sovereign 
immunity and as the cause of action for review of agency action under the 
American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994.259 Nonetheless, 
although the link never was fully severed, the tether to the APA’s review 
provisions and thus to a statutory-based cause of action was always loose and 
became more so during the course of the litigation. For example, in an early 
appellate decision in Cobell in 2001, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that “the 1994 
Act is not the source of plaintiffs’ rights,”260 saying instead that “an action for 
accounting is an equitable claim and that courts of equity have original jurisdiction 
to compel an accounting.”261 (Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit retreated somewhat, 
cautioning in a later Cobell appeal that the court should not too readily “abstract[] 
the common law duties from any statutory basis.”262) 
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In post-Cobell Indian breach of trust litigation in the District Court, most tribal 
plaintiffs wholly abandoned the APA as a source of a substantive right of action, 
while still asking the courts to recognize the APA as providing the necessary 
statutory consent to litigate against the federal government. In the breach of trust 
cases by the Tohono O’odham Nation and other tribes in consolidated litigation 
before the District Court for the District of Columbia, the tribes argued that they 
possessed an independent cause of action in equity for an accounting that can be 
enforced outside of the APA.263 The tribes insisted they had stated a “non-APA 
claim for an accounting,”264 denying that their accounting right was based on the 
1994 statute and the judicial review provisions of the APA. They said that they 
have presented “a pure trust claim,” which “in no way implicates the substantive or 
procedural standards of the APA.”265 
Rather, in this post-Cobell litigation, the tribes described their District Court 
complaints as stating “an independent, equitable cause of action by a trust 
beneficiary to enforce express and implied federal statutory trust 
responsibilities.”266 In so doing, they “invoke[d the District] Court’s inherent 
equitable authority to enforce the terms of that statutorily-created trust.”267 And the 
tribes further sought from the District Court what they characterized as 
restitutionary remedies for any misplaced or lost tribal funds.268 
 
a. The Requirement of a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity and a Substantive Cause 
of Action 
For any plaintiff to bring a civil lawsuit against the United States in any federal 
court, the plaintiff must adduce three things: (1) subject matter jurisdiction, (2) a 
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, and (3) a substantive cause of action. 
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Unless superseded by another statute that directs exclusive jurisdiction in 
another forum, the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1331, 
confers authority on the District Court to review federal agency action.269 In 1976, 
Congress amended the APA to expressly waive the sovereign immunity of the 
government, thereby allowing suits seeking judicial review of an agency’s action to 
be brought directly against the government itself in federal District Court.270 
Section 702 of the APA thus provides: 
An action in a court of the United States . . . stating a claim that an 
agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an 
official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed 
nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United 
States or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United 
States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment 
or decree may be entered against the United States.271 
Beyond waiving sovereign immunity, the APA itself creates a substantive right of 
action by outlining the right to review of final agency action under § 704 and the 
remedies available for judicial review of agency action in § 706.272 
Although post-Cobell tribal plaintiffs in District Court cited to the general 
federal-question jurisdictional statute and to the APA’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity, they declined the APA’s express right of action for judicial review of 
agency action. Instead, the tribes wished to avoid the limitations of administrative 
law and secure a broader judicial investigation and evaluation of the government’s 
handling of tribal trust accounts.273 To succeed with that approach, however, the 
tribal plaintiffs had to find another private right of action in another statutory 
source. Failing to identify a statutory right of action, the tribes instead asserted an 
independent cause of action that arises in equity and requires the government to 
provide a broad-based accounting for all Indian assets held in trust. 
b. The Non-Viability of an Independent Cause of Action for an Accounting in 
Equity 
While the tribes’ assertion of an independent equitable cause of action was 
always doubtful,274 it plainly has been swept aside by Supreme Court rulings in 
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Indian breach of trust cases over the past few years. In those cases, decided in 2009 
and 2011, the Supreme Court clarified and emphasized that duties based directly on 
the general law of trusts cannot give rise to legally cognizable rights by tribes to 
sue the United States government for breach of trust. 
In United States v. Navajo Nation,275 decided in 2009, the Court stated that a 
tribe alleging breach of trust must identify a statute that creates a specific fiduciary 
duty and allege that the government violated that statutorily defined duty.276 While 
“principles of trust law might be relevant” to the next question of whether a remedy 
of damages is available for breach of trust, they play no role in the “threshold” 
question of whether an enforceable duty exists.277 
In United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,278 decided in 2011, the Court further 
emphasized the requirement of a statutory foundation for fiduciary duties and 
rejected the existence of a governmental duty to disclose information about tribal 
trust accounts beyond that specified in a statute. During Indian trust litigation 
brought in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), the government objected to 
discovery requests by the Jicarilla Apache Nation as seeking documents protected 
by the government’s attorney-client privilege.279 The CFC and the Federal Circuit 
applied a common-law exception to the privilege based on the duty of a trustee to 
share all information with the beneficiary and not withhold attorney-client 
communications.280 In rejecting the application of a common-law fiduciary 
exception to the attorney-client privilege in Indian breach of trust suits against the 
United States, the Court made two statements directly pertinent to the question of 
whether an independent cause of action for an accounting is available to the tribes 
based on the inherent equitable powers of the federal courts. 
First, in a majority opinion by Justice Alito, the Jicarilla Apache Court held: 
Although the Government’s responsibilities with respect to the 
management of funds belonging to Indian tribes bear some resemblance 
to those of a private trustee, this analogy cannot be taken too far. The 
trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are established 
and governed by statute rather than the common law, and in fulfilling 
its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a private trustee but 
pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law.281 
While general trust principles may play a role “to inform [the Court’s] 
interpretation of statutes and to determine the scope of liability” for breach of trust, 
the trust duties imposed on the government are defined by statute.282 In other 
words, common-law trust principles still have a robust role to play in constructing 
the meaning and specific application of a fiduciary duty that has been established 
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by a statute or regulation, but the existence of the fiduciary duty must arise directly 
from the statute or regulation and not be inferred from the common law.283 In 
essence, then, the Jicarilla Apache Court ruled,“[t]he Government assumes Indian 
trust responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by 
statute.”284 
The Supreme Court thereby disavowed any non-statutory source for a 
substantive right by an American Indian tribe or member against the United States 
under the trust doctrine. Whether described as a common-law theory or an inherent 
equitable right grounded in general trust law, the post-Cobell tribes’ assertion of an 
independent, non-statutory right to a wide-sweeping equitable accounting of tribal 
assets in District Court no longer can be sustained. Because trust responsibilities 
must be grounded directly on the terms of a statute, an independent cause of action 
for an accounting does not survive after Jicarilla Apache. 
Second, the Court in Jicarilla Apache held that the United States “does not have 
the same common-law disclosure obligations as a private trustee.”285 Rather, 
Congress has specified “narrowly defined disclosure obligations” in the trust 
accounting and management statutes, which may not be read “to incorporate the 
full duties of a private, common-law fiduciary.”286 
Accordingly, the government’s duties to disclose information—which lie at the 
heart of any request for an accounting—are limited to those stated in the 1994 Act 
and other statutes. In contrast with the rulings in Cobell and post-Cobell litigation, 
which are now superseded by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Navajo Nation and 
Jicarilla Apache, the parameters of the government’s duties to provide an 
accounting and reconciliation are those detailed in the statutes and may not be 
augmented by judicially-fashioned equitable or common-law notions. 
When Congress has intended to make the United States liable in court pursuant 
to common-law causes of action, it has done so expressly. Under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 287 which waives sovereign immunity for tort-based claims against the 
United States, the substantive cause of action is to be found in the law of “the place 
where the act or omission” giving rise to the claim occurred.288 In this way, as the 
Supreme Court later explained, Congress determined “to build upon the legal 
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relationships formulated and characterized by the States” rather than create new 
federal tort causes of action.289 By contrast, Congress chose to provide a remedy to 
tribes for breach of trust through the Indian Tucker Act, which turns the focus on 
federal statutes and regulations as a source of rights.290 
c. Contrasting the Scope of an APA Claim for Accounting with the Indian Tucker 
Act Claim for Breach of Trust 
Setting aside for the moment the premise of this Article that the availability of a 
money judgment in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) in an Indian breach of trust 
case precludes a claim for an accounting in District Court, the first obstacle 
presented to post-Cobell lawsuits by Jicarilla Apache could be (partially) 
overcome. Tribal plaintiffs seeking to hold on to District Court review could 
premise their claims fully and completely on the APA, both as a waiver of 
sovereign immunity and as a right of action. By restoring the APA to the center of 
the lawsuit, those Indian breach of trust claims would be cognizable—if at all—
only as administrative law claims. In general, these tribal accounting claims would 
be subject to the same standards and limitations on APA review that apply to other 
cases involving court review of final agency action. 
The second obstacle posed by Jicarilla Apache to a separate claim for 
accounting brought in District Court goes directly to the scope of the claim and the 
remedy. With particular relevance to accounting claims, the Supreme Court in 
Jicarilla Apache pointedly stated that a tribe’s right to information about the 
government’s management of trust funds is limited to those disclosure duties set 
forth in the trust fund accounting statutes.291 Tribal plaintiffs prosecuting 
accounting claims in District Court henceforth will be restricted to identifying 
specific ways in which the government has failed to provide particular information 
that the statutes expressly required the government to disclose. Otherwise, under 
Jicarilla Apache, the government has no general duty to disclose records and thus, 
as a matter of substantive law, is not legally obliged to provide a broader 
accounting and reconciliation. 
For example, the 1994 statute requires the government to provide quarterly 
statements of trust account performance and an annual audit letter with respect to 
tribal trust accounts,292 as well as a report to Congress that reconciles the balances 
for each trust account.293 Requests for additional records, for records about assets 
other than tribal trust accounts or royalties that are governed by statutory disclosure 
rules, and for information in a different form or on a different timetable than the 
periodic statements, letters, and reports specified in the statutes presumably will 
now be unavailing—at least in a direct claim for an accounting as such. 
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(2001). 
 293. 25 U.S.C. § 4044 (2006). 
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Importantly, tribal plaintiffs who sue—not for a mere accounting—but for a 
money judgment for breach of trust under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker 
Act in the CFC may be entitled to a broader remedy and to greater access to 
evidence.294 If the tribes establish the necessary fiduciary relationship, prove a 
breach of the government’s duties, and demonstrate they have suffered economic 
injury, then they may obtain a money judgment as well as correction of financial 
records.295 
To be sure, even during discovery in a CFC case, which after all is where the 
Jicarilla Apache case arose, the government’s duty to share particular documents 
and records about trust funds would be limited to what the governing information 
disclosure statutes provide, per Jicarilla Apache. However, when the issue is not 
merely the sharing of information but proving financial injury through 
mismanagement of trust accounts or other tribal resources by the government under 
an established fiduciary relationship, the tribes presumably remain entitled to 
directed discovery of certain kinds of additional evidence about the nature of the 
assets held in trust, the government’s exercise of its duties, and the extent of 
harm—excluding, of course, any materials over which the government properly 
asserts the attorney-client privilege. 
Moreover, as an essential aid to the CFC in granting a money judgment, the 
court presumably retains the power to secure the evidence needed to determine the 
proper size of that judgment. By express statutory provision, the CFC has authority 
to “call upon any department or agency of the United States . . . for any information 
or papers, not privileged, for purposes of discovery or for use as evidence”296 and to 
issue “subpoenas requiring the production of books, papers, documents or tangible 
things.”297 
Consider, for example, the situation in United States v. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe,298 which the Supreme Court decided in favor of the Tribe in 2003. There, 
Congress had declared that Fort Apache and other improvements on the site, such 
as a school, would be held in trust for the benefit of the White Mountain Apache 
tribe of east-central Arizona.299 The government occupied and used the property, as 
allowed under the trust statute, but then allowed the property to fall into 
disrepair.300 The Tribe sued in the CFC for breach of trust, seeking compensation 
for the projected costs of repairs and additional damages for economic loss.301 
The pertinent Indian trust account statutes do not provide for an accounting of 
non-monetary trust assets, nor did the particular statute creating the Fort Apache 
trust create any specific duties about disclosure of information.302 Accordingly, 
after Jicarilla Apache, a suit by the White Mountain Apache Tribe for an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 294. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 295. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 296. 28 U.S.C. § 2507(a) (2006). 
 297. Id. § 2521(a). 
 298. 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
 299. Id. at 468–69. 
 300. Id. at 469. 
 301. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 20, 22–23 (1999), rev’d, 
249 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 302. Act of Mar. 18, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960). 
2013] JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS 121 
 
accounting under the APA in District Court would have been without purpose, for 
no independent duty of accounting or disclosure of particular information pursuant 
to statute existed. 
But as part of the Indian breach of trust claim under the Tucker Act and the 
Indian Tucker Act, the White Mountain Apache Tribe surely was entitled to obtain 
evidence through discovery about how the property had been used, to establish the 
type and extent of damage to the improvements, to determine the economic benefit 
the government had obtained from its use, and so forth. And the CFC trial judge 
certainly needed access to government-controlled evidence so that the money 
judgment entered for the government’s waste of the real property held in trust was 
not speculative. 
Accordingly, while the Jicarilla Apache decision restricts access to particular 
trust account records to those which must be disclosed by statute, the decision 
should not be understood as a general immunity of the federal government from 
appropriate discovery in a liability proceeding, subject of course to protection for 
privilege. Evidence other than trust account records, such as answers to 
interrogatory questions, depositions of responsible government officials, and other 
documentary evidence of breach of trust or resulting harm, surely remains 
discoverable in breach of trust litigation. 
In White Mountain Apache, the Supreme Court held that the tribe was entitled to 
damages for the government’s waste of the property.303 That declared right to a 
remedy would be meaningless without supporting evidence, at least some of which 
would likely be held only by the government. 
In sum, an action for an accounting, separated from a claim for money damages, 
is now limited by Jicarilla Apache to securing only those records that the 
government is required to disclose by specific statutory direction. The scope of the 
claim consequently is limited and no longer may be augmented by judicially-
fashioned duties. In any event, the remedy for an accounting claim in District Court 
under the APA certainly would be no broader (and perhaps narrower) than an 
accounting or its equivalent that could be obtained as collateral relief in a suit in the 
Court of Federal Claims for a money judgment or as part of discovery under the 
Tucker Act or the Indian Tucker Act.304 
d. The Doubtful Availability of a Restitutionary Monetary Remedy under the APA 
Plaintiffs with disputes against the federal government that are essentially 
economic in nature—and who wish not only to evade the Tucker Act jurisdiction of 
the Court of Federal Claims, but also to secure an order by the District Court for the 
payment of money under the APA—frequently frame their pleas as requests for 
restitution. By asking for what they characterize as an equitable restitutionary 
remedy, these plaintiffs seek to avoid the “money damages” exclusion of § 702 of 
the APA. In this way, these plaintiffs hope both to retain the District Court as the 
venue for their cause of action against the federal government and to obtain an 
award of money without resort to the Court of Federal Claims. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 303. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 478–79. 
 304. On the collateral equitable-type powers of the CFC, see supra notes 247–256 and 
accompanying text. 
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The “restitution” gambit for obtaining payment of past-due money under the 
APA has been tried repeatedly in the various federal courts, with decidedly mixed 
success.305 And this restitution-as-not-money-damages argument became a central 
feature of the post-Cobell Indian breach of trust lawsuits in District Court. 
Even if an accounting cause of action remains viable as a strict APA claim, 
tribal claims in the future for an accounting in District Court likely will be 
restricted to obtaining the disclosure of information and perhaps reconciliation of 
account balances as specifically mandated by statute or regulation. Claims for 
monetary relief for mistakes in trust accounts, whether styled as claims for 
“equitable restitution” or as other common-law or equity claims, likely are not 
cognizable in District Court. 
Navajo Nation and Jicarilla Apache plainly preclude the creation of legal or 
equitable causes of action or remedies that are not grounded directly in a statute.306 
Especially since a monetary cause of action and money judgment remedy is directly 
and expressly available in the CFC through the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker 
Act, inference of a supposed equitable monetary claim or remedy in the District 
Court is increasingly implausible. 
To begin with, the suggestion that characterizing a remedy as “equitable” will 
bring it within the parameters of the APA is confused.307 Lawyers and judges 
frequently describe the judicial review powers of the District Court under the APA 
as being “equitable” in nature, probably because a court may enforce an APA 
ruling overturning agency action by issuing an injunction, and to contrast APA 
relief from excluded “money damages,”308 which traditionally was a legal remedy. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 305. See, e.g., Hubbard v. EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 538–39 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(rejecting claim that back pay in federal civilian employment dispute could be sought under 
the APA as “restitution”); Zellous v. Broadhead Assocs., 906 F.2d 94, 96–100 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(permitting low-income tenants to pursue “retrospective restitution” under the APA for 
having had to pay higher rents to housing projects under federal rent subsidy because the 
government failed to timely adjust the tenants’ utility allowances); Witt v. U.S. Dep’t. of Air 
Force, No. C06-519RBL, 2010 WL 3522519, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 7, 2010) (holding that 
back pay and retirement credits sought by discharged service member was beyond authority 
of the court under the APA); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Veneman, 355 F. Supp. 2d 181, 192–96 
(D.D.C. 2005) (holding that sugar producers seeking reimbursement of money paid to the 
government in allegedly unlawful higher interest rate for sugar price support loans were 
“entitled to restitution under the APA” as specific relief rather than money damages), rev’d 
on other grounds, 437 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Leistiko v. Sec’y of the Army, 922 F. 
Supp. 66, 72 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (rejecting discharged National Guard technician’s claim that 
his APA suit for lost wages and benefits was for “equitable restitution” and not for excluded 
money damages); Int’l Marine Carriers v. Oil Spill Liab. Trust Fund, 903 F. Supp. 1097, 
1102 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that operator of vessel challenging denial of claim for 
reimbursement for certain oil removal costs from a government-operated trust fund was 
seeking “restitution, not damages” and could proceed under the APA). 
 306. See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
 307. See Hubbard, 982 F.2d at 537 (explaining in a federal employment dispute that 
“reliance on cases calling back pay ‘equitable’ for other purposes is . . . misplaced,” because 
the “crucial question” is not whether a remedy is equitable but whether it constitutes specific 
relief that falls outside the exclusion of “money damages” from the APA). 
 308. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
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However, “[w]hat may qualify as an ‘equitable remedy’” in other contexts “is not 
synonymous with specific relief,” which is available under the APA.309 
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, 
Inc.,310 the APA allows a court to grant “specific relief” that is not “substitute 
relief” and does “not turn on distinctions between ‘equitable’ actions and other 
actions.”311 A court’s power of judicial review over agency action does not arise 
from inherent equitable (or common-law) powers, but rather from a grant of 
authority by the terms of the APA itself. 
Even though an order issued by a court under the judicial review provisions of 
the APA sometimes may overlap with an equitable remedy, the APA remedy is 
properly characterized as one for specific relief and as focused on review of 
particular agency action. Thus, for example, in Bowen v. Massachusetts,312 the 
Supreme Court approved an order of specific relief under the APA that reversed a 
federal agency’s disallowance of a state request for reimbursement under the 
Medicaid federal-state financial participation program.313 The specific relief 
allowed in Bowen bore some resemblance to the equitable remedy of restitution 
because it restored money to which the state was entitled by statute.314 However, 
even the Bowen Court did not appear to regard the relief granted as having a past-
due monetary effect, but rather as modifying prospective government practices 
through adjustments of future advances in revolving accounts for funding the 
federal-state Medicaid program.315 Indeed, the Bowen Court regarded a money 
judgment as inadequate in that case, given the need “for prospective relief 
fashioned in the light of the rather complex ongoing relationship between” the 
federal government and the state.316 As the bottom line in Bowen, the specific relief 
granted under the APA constituted the undoing of the agency’s action in 
disallowing an expense, not a grant of a general restitutionary remedy for an 
equitable purpose. 
And, lest there be any lingering questions about the nature and scope of APA 
relief, the Supreme Court in Blue Fox clarified that courts should not 
misunderstand Bowen or misconstrue the APA “as waiving immunity from all 
actions that are equitable in nature.”317 
                                                                                                                 
 
 309. Hubbard, 982 F.2d at 537. 
 310. 525 U.S. 255 (1999). 
 311. Id. at 261–62. 
 312. 487 U.S. 879 (1988); see supra Part I.B. 
 313. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 892–901. 
 314. Indeed, the Medicaid statute at issue in Bowen labeled the reversal of a disallowance 
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involved in Bowen as “requir[ing] the Secretary to modify future Medicaid practices” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 316. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 905. 
 317. Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (explaining further 
that the term “equitable” is “found nowhere” in § 702 of the APA). 
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So understood, an equitable claim for “restitution” or “disgorgement,” such as 
that raised by tribes in the post-Cobell litigation in District Court,318 is difficult to 
shoehorn into the APA as a request for “specific relief.” Indeed, the “equitable 
lien” device—which the Supreme Court refused to recognize under the APA in 
Blue Fox—is of the same equitable species as the equitable constructive trust 
device that gives rise to the remedy of specific restitution.319 Whether characterized 
as an equitable lien, a constructive trust, or a specific restitutionary remedy, when 
the remedy sought is “merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the 
recovery of money,” then the Supreme Court has confirmed that it is not a proper 
request for specific relief under the APA but instead falls into the exclusion for 
“money damages.”320 
Even if the APA did generally encompass equitable claims and remedies, tribal 
claims in breach of trust cases likely do not state a proper request for a 
restitutionary cause of action or remedy, unless strictly limited to the recovery of 
specifically identifiable funds that the government still possesses. When a tribal 
plaintiff contends that the government has lost funds that should have been held in 
trust for a tribe, the request for reimbursement probably would not be classified as 
specific restitution because the plaintiff’s missing funds could not “clearly be 
traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.”321 When “‘the 
property sought to be recovered or its proceeds have been dissipated so that no 
product remains,’”322 the claim may sound in restitution, but it is restitution at law 
and not equity and is remedied by an ordinary money judgment. As the Supreme 
Court said in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, “not all relief 
falling under the rubric of restitution is available in equity.”323 
When the funds to which a plaintiff lays claim cannot be traced to a specific res 
(such that the court effectively finds the identifiable property to belong to the 
plaintiff), then specific restitution is not available.324 When the defendant is the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 318. See Complaint at Prayer ¶¶ 1, 6, Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian 
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 319. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(3) (2d ed. 1993) (explaining that “[t]he 
equitable lien . . . is essentially a special, and limited, form of the constructive trust”); 
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constructive trust (§ 55) transfers actual ownership of specific property from the holder of 
legal title to a person with a superior claim, equitable lien subjects the holder’s property to a 
security interest in favor of the claimant.”). 
 320. See Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 262–63; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
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 321. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002). 
 322. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 215 cmt. a  (1936)). 
 323. Id. at 212; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. a (2011) (“The status of restitution as belonging to law or to equity 
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Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 931 (2012) 
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 324. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 319, § 6.1(3). The majority and traditional view under the 
law of restitution insists that “tracing of the plaintiff’s funds into identifiable property” is 
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United States, the equitable concept of tracing is of doubtful application. With the 
federal government, unless the particular funds belonging to a claimant can be 
identified in a discrete account (even if commingled with other funds), monies to 
recompense for lost funds will come from the public treasury and ultimately be 
paid by taxpayers. Under the traditional law of restitution as applied to private 
defendants, when “the tracing is incomplete,” then no res can be identified and no 
specific restitution is available, leaving the plaintiff instead in the position of a 
“simple debtor” who has a legal claim for money damages.325 
Not surprisingly, then, “[t]he vast majority of restitution claims are both legal 
and substitutionary, with the plaintiff entitled to no more than a money judgment 
serving as the measured substitute of the defendant’s unjustly retained benefit.”326 
Indeed, even the Cobell District Court recognized that a claim by the Indian trust 
account claimants for reimbursement of lost trust funds would be compensatory in 
nature—and thus outside the scope of the APA—if “the money is missing from the 
trust.”327 Importantly, the United States has waived sovereign immunity for claims 
seeking such a money judgment—but only under the Tucker Act and in the Court 
of Federal Claims. 
Whether characterized as equitable or legal in nature, “restitution” as an 
independent remedy simply is not available under the APA. The general law of 
restitution “is the law relating to all claims, quasi-contractual or otherwise, which 
are founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment.”328 No statutory waiver of 
                                                                                                                 
essential, requiring more than showing merely that the defendant’s assets were, at some 
point in time, “swollen or ‘augmented’ by the plaintiff’s money.” Id.; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58 cmt. e (2011) (“The doctrine [of 
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 327. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 1999) (“At most, the enforcement of 
this statutory right [to an accounting] may partially support some future monetary claim (but 
not necessarily ‘money damages’), which, because this is plaintiffs’ own money, will only be 
compensatory to the extent that the money is missing from the trust.”), aff’d sub nom. Cobell 
v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 328. LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 3 (3d ed. 
1986); see also Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1226 (1995) 
(“The simplest possible account of the law of restitution . . . will describe it as the branch of 
civil liability that is based on and measured by the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the 
expense of the plaintiff.”). 
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federal sovereign immunity authorizes any general or independent cause of action 
for restitution or unjust enrichment against the United States. The United States has 
not subjected itself to liability under general theories of equity or law, divorced 
from a specific statutory cause of action and accompanying statutory remedy. 
With the foregoing in mind, if a person or tribe alleged inaccurate trust account 
balances because funds mistakenly had been deposited into one account instead of 
another or had been misallocated between recipients, specific relief under the APA 
might be available to order the necessary and simple shifting of funds. In Bowen, 
the Supreme Court similarly described the specific relief in that case as merely 
“adjustments in the open account” by which the federal government reimbursed 
states for Medicaid expenses.329 While the Cobell litigation ultimately was resolved 
with a broad-based monetary and compensatory settlement, the District Court 
earlier described the complaint as seeking merely a reconciliation of trust fund 
accounts, alleging that “the money is in the account but the ledger cannot be 
properly kept, so the stated balance is incorrect. In the plaintiffs’ view, they only 
seek to balance the checkbook, not add any money to the checking account.”330 
Although the true nature of the litigation was revealed at the end, the plaintiffs in 
Cobell insisted in the early stages that they did “not seek an additional infusion of 
money.”331 
By contrast, if the money owed to a Native American or tribe never had been 
properly deposited into any trust account or had been misplaced or misappropriated 
thereafter, the necessary infusion of cash from the public treasury—whether 
characterized as “restitution” or something else—would be much more difficult to 
characterize as “specific relief.”332 The relief sought would involve more than 
simply overturning an agency’s erroneous decision under APA review provisions. 
And because the use of generally appropriated public funds to reimburse claimants 
for specific trust funds lost by the government would be a substitutionary remedy, 
it should be characterized as “money damages” and thereby excluded from the 
APA, even under the Bowen analysis.333 
At the end of the day, such a supposedly “restitutionary” remedy for misplaced 
trust account funds is simply a type of money judgment, which readily could be 
heard in the Court of Federal Claims.334 Moreover, no one contends that profits lost 
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by a tribe or individual because the federal government failed to properly invest 
trust funds would be anything other than “money damages,” relief that is expressly 
excluded under the APA.335 Again, while such requests for relief fall outside the 
scope of the APA and are beyond the authority of the District Court, the doors of 
the CFC courthouse have been open to those monetary relief claims. 
In sum, a request for “restitution” or “disgorgement,” whether sounding in 
equity or the common law, likely falls outside the parameters of the APA, which is 
limited to specific relief directed at final agency action reviewed under the 
standards of the APA. Blue Fox clarified that the APA does not waive immunity 
generally for equitable claims or remedies, and Jicarilla Apache confirmed that 
cognizable rights may not be judicially crafted but must be specified in the 
governing statute. For these reasons, an accounting claim under the APA may not 
encompass a request for restitution when such an award involves the substitution of 
new money to compensate for dissipated funds—even aside from the withdrawal of 
judicial review under the APA when a Tucker Act remedy is available. 
Given that Congress has designed a specific monetary remedy for Indian breach 
of trust claims in the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, claims for money—
whether framed as money damages, restitution, or disgorgement—must be pursued 
under that vehicle and in the CFC. 
e. Inference of Remedy for Breach of Trust Claims Tied to the Special Nature of 
Indian Tucker Act 
Somewhat ironically, in the post-Cobell litigation, tribal plaintiffs urged the 
District Court to infer the existence of an independent accounting claim in equity 
by citing Indian breach of trust decisions that had been pursued under the Tucker 
Act and comfortably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal 
Claims. Observing that the Supreme Court has recognized a right to sue for 
damages as implied in federal statutes establishing a fiduciary relationship, these 
tribal plaintiffs have cited336 such decisions as United States v. Mitchell337 and 
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe.338 By invoking these decisions, 
which turn on the particular character of the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker as 
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, the tribes’ argument proves too much and 
tellingly confirms the CFC as the proper venue.  
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As discussed earlier,339 the foundation for landmark Indian breach of trust 
claims resolved by the Supreme Court has been the Tucker Act or the Indian 
Tucker Act. These two statutes waive federal sovereign immunity and expressly 
authorize litigation against the United States. Neither statute creates a substantive 
cause of action, which instead must be derived from another “money-mandating” 
statute or from the existence of a fiduciary relationship grounded in rights- or 
duties-creating statutory language.340 However, and importantly, even a genuine 
right-creating statute does not give rise to a cause of action that is independent of 
the Tucker Act or the Indian Tucker Act. 
As a general rule, for any civil suit against any defendant to proceed, the 
Supreme Court has said it must “interpret the statute Congress has passed to 
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a 
private remedy.”341 Thus, in most circumstances, that a reader might infer a 
substantive right from a statute gives rise to no enforceable legal claim, if the 
statute does not also include explicit language contemplating a remedy in court for 
a deprivation of that substantive right. 
In the special context of the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, however, the 
federal statute from which the substantive right is inferred need not also include an 
express private right of action. The right to seek a judicial remedy has already been 
supplied by the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act. In Indian breach of trust 
cases, such as Mitchell and White Mountain Apache,342 when the right-creating 
statute confirms a fiduciary relationship, the Supreme Court not only has found a 
cause of action but also has drawn on general trust principles to imply a damages 
remedy. But, again, those decisions are anchored in the special nature of the Tucker 
Act and the Indian Tucker Act, which provide for adjudication of recognized 
claims in the special venue of the Court of Federal Claims. 
The tribal plaintiffs in the post-Cobell District Court litigation are correct to this 
extent: there is a private right of action for Indian breach of trust claims against the 
United States and it is independent of the APA. But that independent private right 
of action is found in the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act. And, in both the 
Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, the very language that facilitates the 
enforcement of the right and remedy against the United States also reposits subject 
matter jurisdiction in the CFC. 
The road for an Indian breach of trust claim arising from the federal 
government’s management of Indian assets or funds runs directly through the 
Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act and leads without detour to the Court of 
Federal Claims. 
* * * 
Whatever the theoretical viability or scope of a cause of action for an accounting 
of Indian trust assets, it hardly is surprising that such a claim does not fit 
comfortably under the APA. Instead, as the Supreme Court recognized nearly thirty 
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years ago, “Indians were to be given ‘their fair day in court so that they can call the 
various Government agencies to account on the obligations that the Federal 
government assumed’” by Congress’s enactment of that specific waiver of 
sovereign immunity commonly known as the Indian Tucker Act.343 
Because Congress designed a specially tailored remedy for Indian breach of 
trust claims in the Court of Federal Claims through the Indian Tucker Act, yet 
another limitation on APA review in District Court is implicated. Section 702 
precludes APA review “if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or 
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”344 Thus, for example, “[t]he waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act does not run to actions 
seeking declaratory relief or specific performance in [government] contract cases” 
because “the Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act impliedly forbid such relief.”345 
Likewise, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is withdrawn for Indian breach 
of trust claims when a money judgment could be sought under the Indian Tucker 
Act, which thus “impliedly forbids” bypassing the particular remedy created by 
Congress and the particular forum that Congress designated. 
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL COLLISION IN UNITED STATES V. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION 
A. Duplicative Litigation in Both the District Court and the Court of Federal 
Claims 
The projection of District Court authority over Indian breach of trust litigation in 
Cobell v. Babbit346 opened the floodgates at the E. Barrett Prettyman Federal 
Courthouse in Washington, D.C. Dozens of suits alleging mismanagement by the 
government of Indian assets and funds are now pending before the District Court 
for the District of Columbia.347 Setting the stage for a jurisdictional collision, in 
thirty-one instances, American Indian tribes filed pairs of breach of trust suits in 
both the CFC and in the District Court.348 Although the United States reached a $1 
billion settlement of breach of trust claims with forty-one tribes in April 2012,349 
dozens of other suits alleging mismanagement of tribal accounts by the federal 
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 347. See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Norton, 527 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133–34 (D.D.C. 
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government continue forward, most of which are more complex and could require 
larger monetary payments to resolve.350 
When lawsuits against the United States involving the same events or set of 
circumstances are pending simultaneously in both the Court of Federal Claims and 
another court, 28 U.S.C. § 1500351 is implicated. Section 1500 prohibits the Court 
of Federal Claims from exercising jurisdiction “of any claim for or in respect to 
which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other court any suit or process against the 
United States.”352 
The predecessor to § 1500 was enacted by Congress in the aftermath of the Civil 
War to address duplicative litigation filed against the federal government and 
federal officers by the so-called Cotton Claimants.353 The Supreme Court 
summarized the “lineage” of this statutory text in Keene Corporation v. United 
States:354 
[R]esidents of the Confederacy who had involuntarily parted with 
property (usually cotton) during the war sued the United States for 
compensation in the Court of Claims, under the Abandoned Property 
Collection Act. When these cotton claimants had difficulty meeting the 
statutory condition that they must have given no aid or comfort to 
participants in the rebellion, they resorted to separate suits in other 
courts seeking compensation not from the Government as such but 
from federal officials, and not under the statutory cause of action but on 
tort theories such as conversion. It was these duplicative lawsuits that 
induced Congress to prohibit anyone from filing or prosecuting in the 
Court of Claims “any claim . . . for or in respect to which he . . . shall 
have commenced and has pending” an action in any other court against 
an officer or agent of the United States. The statute has long outlived 
the cotton claimants . . . .355 
Reading § 1500 in a manner that ameliorates perceived hardships for plaintiffs 
who wish to seek relief against the federal government in different courts, when 
                                                                                                                 
 
 350. Id. (“About 60 other similar lawsuits by tribes against the United States have not been 
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 354. 508 U.S. 200 (1993). 
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jurisdictional limitations preclude joining the claims in a single lawsuit,356 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted two narrow 
interpretations (characterized by detractors as judicially crafted exceptions) that 
drained much of the force from the statute.357 
First, the court held that a later-filed District Court suit does not oust the Court 
of Federal Claims of jurisdiction to hear a prior-filed Tucker Act claim.358 Thus, 
under Federal Circuit precedent, the application of § 1500 turns entirely on the 
order of filing. If the CFC takes jurisdiction over a lawsuit at a point in time in 
which no parallel litigation is pending in another court, that jurisdictional authority 
is not lost by the subsequent filing, even just a day or perhaps hours later, in 
District Court of an action based on the same set of facts. Because this 
interpretation originated from a decision by the old Court of Claims in Tecon 
Engineers v. United States,359 the order-of-filing holding is frequently called the 
Tecon rule or exception. 
Second, the Federal Circuit did not regard a District Court lawsuit as “for or in 
respect” to an action in the CFC if the two lawsuits sought distinctly different 
relief. Thus, for example, if a lawsuit sought specific relief from the United States 
under the APA in District Court, while a simultaneous lawsuit sought money 
damages under the Tucker Act in the CFC, § 1500 would not bar the CFC from 
proceeding despite the pending District Court action.360 The different-relief 
holding, which also originated under the old Court of Claims in Casman v. United 
States,361 was sometimes called the Casman rule or exception. 
In United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,362 an Indian Nation filed suit in the 
District Court, alleging that the government had breached its duties of trust by 
mismanaging tribal assets and money.363 In the District Court, the Nation sought an 
accounting of the government’s management of tribal assets, as well as equitable 
restitution of any assets not properly maintained for the tribe.364 On the very next 
day, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, again alleging a breach of 
trust by the government, but here seeking the remedy of money damages.365 
                                                                                                                 
 
 356. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
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Because both lawsuits arose out of the same factual circumstances—both 
complaints offered nearly identical allegations of breach of trust366—and because 
the Nation sought monetary relief in both courts, the CFC dismissed the suit under 
§ 1500.367 A divided Federal Circuit reversed, with the majority holding that, even 
though both lawsuits presumably arose out of the same underlying facts and both 
sought relief in the form of money, the District Court lawsuit was framed in equity 
to seek restitution of “old money” (lost trust funds) and the CFC lawsuit was 
framed in law to seek damages for “new money” (lost profits) and thus sought 
different relief.368 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tohono O’odham Nation to resolve 
“what it means for two suits to be ‘for or in respect to’ the same claim” within the 
meaning of § 1500.369 Speaking for a five-justice majority, Justice Kennedy 
dispensed with comparisons of the types of relief sought or legal theories presented 
in the two lawsuits and ruled that § 1500 turns solely on the question of whether 
both lawsuits arise out of the same operative facts.370 The statutory language of “for 
or in respect to” the same claim means simply that both suits have a substantial 
factual overlap—“based on substantially the same operative facts”371—regardless 
of whether the remedial requests overlap as well. Characterizing Congress as 
having made “a robust response to the problem first presented by the cotton 
claimants,”372 the Court held the statute should be read broadly to protect the 
government from the “burdens of redundant litigation.”373 
Thus, in the Court’s words, “a common factual basis” for both lawsuits “suffices 
to bar jurisdiction under § 1500.”374 By this standard, the Tohono O’odham 
Nation’s lawsuit in the CFC inevitably had to be dismissed.375 Because the CFC 
action had been filed after the District Court lawsuit, the Court noted that the Tecon 
time-of-filing question was not presented in the case.376 
Concurring in the judgment in Tohono O’odham Nation, Justice Sotomayor 
(joined by Justice Breyer) would have reversed on the alternative ground that the 
two lawsuits by the Nation requested overlapping relief, as both sought monetary 
relief, thus requiring dismissal of the CFC lawsuit under § 1500.377 The concurring 
justices would have reserved the question of whether § 1500 applies when both 
lawsuits involve the same operative facts but entirely different relief, although they 
indicated their belief that “Congress did not intend for § 1500 to put plaintiffs to a 
choice between two nonduplicative remedies that Congress has made available 
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exclusively in two forums.”378 Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter, arguing that 
the CFC should have disregarded the plaintiff’s requests for relief that overlapped 
with that in the District Court or allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint to do 
so.379 Justice Kagan was recused. 
B. The Aftermath of Tohono O’odham Nation 
1. The General Implications of Tohono O’odham Nation for Election of Claim 
Theory and Remedies 
The Tohono O’odham Nation interpretation of § 1500 has significant 
implications for claimants against the federal government in certain substantive and 
procedural contexts—potentially forcing an election of legal theory and even of 
remedy. Harsh consequences ordinarily can be avoided, and the practical 
implications of the jurisdictional bar thus are limited to a small set of claimants in 
certain circumstances. Nonetheless, when it does come into force, § 1500 may 
rather severely constrain the course of action or the remedies available to a 
claimant against the United States. 
Interestingly, however, in the Tohono O’odham Nation case itself, the 
jurisdictional collision could and should have been avoided.380 As emphasized 
throughout this Article, the Indian breach of trust action should have been filed in a 
single forum—the Court of Federal Claims—seeking both a money judgment and 
collateral relief for a correction of any errors in the government’s accounting for 
trust funds. 
Controversies involving § 1500 arise in cases in which a single occurrence or set 
of occurrences give rise to claims based on multiple legal theories that may be 
framed as different, alternative, or succeeding causes of action, one or more of 
which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and 
another for which jurisdiction is conferred upon the District Court. Consider a case 
in which a plaintiff’s pleading for substantial damages could be formulated either 
as a contract claim against the federal government under the Tucker Act, or as a tort 
claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).381 The 
District Court cannot hear contract claims under the Tucker Act seeking more than 
$10,000, authority over which is vested exclusively in the CFC.382 And the CFC 
cannot hear tort claims against the federal government because the Tucker Act 
specifically excludes cases “sounding in tort,”383 while the FTCA provides for 
jurisdiction in the District Court.384 Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot join these 
claims together in a single suit in a single court, for that would defeat the singular 
prerogative of the other court to hear that type of claim. Neither the District Court 
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nor the CFC may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that lies within 
the exclusive province of the other court. 
This forum divergence between the Tucker Act and the FTCA describes the 
circumstances behind the Supreme Court’s previous encounter with § 1500 in 
Keene Corp. v. United States385 in 1993. In that case, asbestos manufacturers 
sought to shift liability to the United States for judgments and settlements paid by 
the manufacturers to shipyard employees. Arguing that the asbestos had been used 
pursuant to government specifications, the manufacturers asserted against the 
United States (1) contract indemnification theories based on a purported implied 
warranty (which stated a cause of action under the Tucker Act within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CFC), and (2) tort-based indemnification or reimbursement 
theories such as contribution (which came under the FTCA with jurisdiction only in 
the District Court).386 Although the manufacturers could not join these two claims 
together in a single forum, the Supreme Court held in Keene that the CFC could not 
take jurisdiction when a lawsuit “based on substantially the same operative facts” 
had been pending in District Court.387 
a. Section 1500 and Election of Legal Theory 
Through the Keene decision, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1500 to force 
claimants in some circumstances to elect a particular legal theory (and abandon 
another) by which to pursue what is essentially the same claim for the same relief 
against the United States. Consider a plaintiff who is prosecuting a tort-based claim 
for damages against the federal government in District Court and then finds itself 
pressing against the statute of limitations for filing a contract breach or other non-
tort money claim in the Court of Federal Claims. In such a circumstance, the 
plaintiff must decide whether to press forward with the pending FTCA claim in the 
District Court or to dismiss the FTCA vehicle for compensation to instead pursue 
the Tucker Act claim in the Court of Federal Claims—but not both.388  
The impact of § 1500 in such instances is thus material, albeit limited as a 
practical matter to only a few cases: 
First, given the unusually long limitations period for actions to be filed in the 
CFC—six years389—the odds are that most FTCA actions in District Court will 
have concluded before the plaintiff must initiate a timely suit in the CFC. However, 
given that the pendency of an FTCA claim for § 1500 purposes includes not only 
the period from the filing of a pleading through the final judgment in the District 
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Court, but also the later disposition of any appeal, occasions may arise in which the 
FTCA matter is not concluded before the plaintiff must consider whether to file or 
waive the Tucker Act claim in the Court of Federal Claims (and Keene itself is an 
example of that scenario made real).390 
Second, if the legal theories—such as tort versus contract—are equally strong or 
weak, forcing the plaintiff to a choice will not affect the ultimate outcome of 
obtaining or failing to obtain a full compensatory remedy. However, the viability of 
a legal theory is not always readily apparent on the front end, especially before 
discovery and preliminary rulings by a court. The legal theory initially selected 
may prove later to be flawed such that the other legal theory then looks more 
promising. Thus, an election of legal theory can affect the ability to obtain success. 
In most but not all cases, the comparative strengths of alternative legal theories will 
become apparent well before the six years have run, so, again, a forced choice of a 
legal theory may not be a major obstacle to the success of most meritorious claims. 
b. Section 1500 and Election of Remedy 
Section 1500 as interpreted in Keene could well force an election of a particular 
legal theory, depending upon whether the statute of limitations were to expire 
during the pendency of the first suit. However, if a plaintiff in a Keene-type 
scenario—choosing between a FTCA suit in District Court and a Tucker Act suit in 
the CFC—makes a wise choice of legal theory, the plaintiff would obtain a full 
recovery. Under both the FTCA and the Tucker Act, the remedy is a money 
judgment. 
By contrast, forcing election of a remedy by barring simultaneous suits that seek 
different relief in separate forums with exclusive authority could preclude full 
recovery notwithstanding the merits of the case. For example, a party cannot obtain 
money damages in the District Court under the APA391 and cannot obtain general 
equitable-type relief disconnected from a money claim in the CFC under the Tucker 
Act.392 If the second suit cannot be brought because the statute of limitations will 
have run before conclusion of the first suit, then the second suit may be precluded 
along with the additional remedy available only in that second suit. 
Through Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1500 in 
a manner that may, sometimes, force a plaintiff to a choice of remedies, thus 
impairing the prospect of a full recovery. As discussed above and below,393 the 
Tohono O’odham Nation case itself was not an example of such a forced selection 
of remedies, because an Indian breach of trust claim may be fully remedied under 
the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act. Other situations could arise, however, in 
which a party would be forced to elect a remedy, and not merely a legal theory, 
thus requiring not only a choice of means but of ends in litigation against the 
federal government. 
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This classic scenario presented itself in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United 
States.394 In that case, plaintiff landowners were aggrieved by federal 
administrative restrictions on the development of wetlands.395 To challenge the 
denial of a development permit, the plaintiffs were obliged to seek APA review in 
the District Court of the agency’s action.396 The APA claim challenging the 
agency’s refusal to grant the permit to develop the land could not have been 
pursued in the CFC because it was not a claim for money (nor was it merely a 
means to the end of monetary relief).397 When it appeared that the APA challenge 
to the permit might be unsuccessful—but while that challenge was still pending on 
appeal—the plaintiff landowners sought compensation for a regulatory taking 
under the Tucker Act, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFC.398 
In Loveladies Harbor, the claims in the District Court to set aside the 
administrative restriction and in the CFC for compensation for the loss of beneficial 
use of the property were, in the words of legal scholar Craig Schwartz,  
“necessarily sequential,”399 as is typical in the context of regulatory takings. In 
Loveladies Harbor, the Federal Circuit held that § 1500 did not bar the CFC action 
because the plaintiffs sought “distinctly different” relief in each suit—specific relief 
under the APA in District Court (essentially seeking an injunction to set aside the 
permit denial) and money damages under the Tucker Act in the CFC (seeking 
compensation for the government’s taking of the property).400 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tohono O’odham Nation plainly overturns the 
Federal Circuit’s “distinctly different” relief rationale for avoiding the application 
of § 1500, adopting instead the “same operative facts” trigger for the jurisdictional 
bar.401 Whether the Loveladies Harbor scenario still triggers the jurisdictional bar 
henceforth will turn on questions about whether both the preceding District Court 
action and the subsequent CFC suit arise from “substantially the same operative 
facts”402 and whether the invocation of a constitutional right to compensation 
requires a different analysis. 
In such regulatory takings cases, the government will focus on the single fact of 
the administrative restriction on property use as giving rise both to the APA review 
action and the Tucker Act takings claim. The government will argue that § 1500 
applies if both suits are pending simultaneously because “the same conduct gave 
rise to different claims based upon purportedly distinct legal theories.”403 
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Observing that the property at issue will be the same and government conduct 
involved will be substantially the same, the government will insist that § 1500 
plainly applies.404 
Claimants against the government will contend that the presence of an 
administrative restriction on property use is merely a background fact, while the 
operative facts for the claims and the material evidence to prove the claims are 
different.405 They will argue that the APA challenge to the property restriction in 
District Court focuses on the statutory and regulatory constraints on agency action, 
while the Tucker Act claim in the CFC addresses whether the owner was deprived 
by the regulation of all economically beneficial use of the property and the just 
compensation due for a taking of property. 
In addition, Craig Schwartz contends that, even after Tohono O’odham Nation, 
the CFC may stay and is not required to dismiss under § 1500 when the plaintiff 
has filed a “necessarily sequential” action in District Court to preserve a 
“substantial legal right.”406 In Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court rejected 
claims of hardship by “forcing plaintiffs to choose between partial remedies 
available in different courts,” saying that “[a]lthough Congress has permitted 
claims against the United States for monetary relief in the CFC, that relief is 
available by grace and not by right.”407 By contrast, as the Federal Circuit stated in 
Loveladies Harbor, applying § 1500 there would place a plaintiff “in the position 
of having to give up a substantial legal right protected by the Takings Clause of the 
Constitution.”408 
Nonetheless, an exception for regulatory taking cases is not to be found in the 
text of § 1500 and was not suggested in Tohono O’odham Nation.409 Concurring in 
the judgment, Justice Sotomayor observed that “[a]fter today’s decision, § 1500 
may well prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a takings claim in the CFC if an action 
to set aside the agency action is pending in district court.”410 The majority offered 
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no response or contradiction.411 As the Federal Circuit explained in Hair v. United 
States,412 in holding that taking claims are subject to the six-year statute of 
limitations, “there is no merit to plaintiff’s argument that the constitutional right to 
just compensation is absolute, any more than any other right is absolute.”413 
Application of § 1500 to the sequential court filings in the regulatory taking 
scenario need not deprive a claimant of just compensation due by constitutional 
right, although it may sometimes require the claimant to surrender a statutory claim 
(which arguably counts as “relief [that] is available by grace and not by right”414) to 
preserve the constitutional claim. Filing suit in the CFC to seek compensation for a 
constitutional taking under the Tucker Act, without filing or being required to 
abandon a previous APA challenge to the agency’s action in District Court, would 
constitute a concession that the agency’s regulatory action was valid but would not 
undermine the claim to compensation for loss of property use.415 To be sure, the 
forced election is a meaningful limitation on a plaintiff’s course of action, but 
whether it crosses a constitutional line is less than certain. 
Moreover, given the six-year statute of limitations period for CFC actions, a 
plaintiff acting promptly to seek judicial review of agency action in the District 
Court ordinarily will see its case rise or fall on the merits before needing to 
consider an alternative vehicle for monetary compensation.416 Indeed, as pointed 
out by the dissenting judge in Loveladies Harbor, the APA action in that case, 
including the appeal, had been resolved in three years, meaning the plaintiff “still 
would have had three years in which to file its claim in the Court of Federal 
Claims . . . after the resolution of its challenge to the permit denial.”417 
In the immediate aftermath of Tohono O’odham Nation, however, some 
plaintiffs will get caught in the slamming door of § 1500, even though the 
jurisdictional bar could have been avoided by waiting to file in the CFC until after 
the final resolution of the parallel District Court litigation. For example, in Central 
Pines Land Co. v. United States,418 the Court of Federal Claims noted that “had the 
plaintiffs understood the impact of section 1500 as has since been expressed in 
Tohono,” they either would not have filed suit in the CFC or would have dismissed 
the original CFC action and waited until after completion of District Court 
litigation before returning to the CFC.419 In such cases, the plaintiffs could have 
avoided simultaneously pending lawsuits by filing them sequentially within 
statutory time limitations. But, having instead assumed that duplicative litigation 
was permissible, the plaintiffs now face unavoidable dismissal of the CFC suit. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 411. But see Schwartz, supra note 239, at 20 n.116 (arguing that because Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion did not cite or repudiate Loveladies Harbor, “[t]he ‘substantial 
legal right’ language from Loveladies Harbor remains good law”).  
 412. 350 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 413. Id. at 1260. 
 414. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1731. 
 415. See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 416. But see Bremer & Siegel, supra note 388, at 50 (arguing that “the speed of 
litigation . . . should not affect the ability to bring claims”).  
 417. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 418. 99 Fed. Cl. 394 (2011). 
 419. Id. at 406. 
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* * * 
Importantly, in neither of the above scenarios—the possibility of a forced 
election of theory or a forced election of remedy—is the complicating factor of 
forum shopping directly implicated. In the Keene scenario, the plaintiffs could 
pursue the FTCA claim only in District Court and could pursue the Tucker Act 
claim only in the CFC—neither forum could hear the other claim as legally framed. 
In the Loveladies Harbor scenario, the plaintiffs could only pursue the APA claim 
in District Court and the Tucker Act claim in the CFC—again neither forum could 
hear the other claim seeking a distinctly different remedy. Precisely because 
plaintiffs in such circumstances are restricted to separate judicial venues for 
pursuing alternative theories or remedies arising from the same factual nucleus, 
§ 1500 may have real bite, and thus is understandably criticized as unfairly 
depriving some claimants of a complete and just recovery. 
A report for the Administrative Conference’s Judicial Review Committee, 
prepared by Emily Schleicher Bremer and Jonathan Siegel, recommends that the 
Administrative Conference propose the repeal of § 1500.420 Although Bremer and 
Siegel acknowledge that repeal would permit some duplicative litigation against the 
United States, they argue that plaintiffs should not be penalized for having to 
pursue related claims in different courts because of jurisdictional limitations.421 
When courts encounter such simultaneously pending cases, Bremer and Siegel 
suggest they may apply preclusion rules and manage their dockets, such as by 
staying one lawsuit until the resolution of the other, and thereby may “mitigate the 
costs of such duplication.”422 Section 1500 is a trap for the unwary (especially, but 
not only, pro se litigants and inexperienced lawyers) and does impose hardship in 
some cases, thus meriting legislative reconsideration of whether it should be 
retained in the modern litigation context. 
But in the Tohono O’odham Nation case itself, the plaintiff brought the § 1500 
problem on itself by engaging in forum shopping and fomenting a duplicative 
litigation problem where it was not necessary. The question of the proper 
jurisdictional home for an Indian breach of trust claim was not directly before the 
Supreme Court in Tohono O’odham Nation. However, as discussed in the next 
section of this Article, the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Tohono O’odham 
Nation strongly suggests that the CFC was empowered to provide a full or at least 
                                                                                                                 
 
 420. Bremer & Siegel, supra note 388, at 7. As of the date this Article was completed, the 
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to replace § 1500 with a statutory provision for a presumptive stay to avoid simultaneous 
litigation of multiple cases arising out of the same operative facts. Comm. on Judicial Review, 
U.S. Admin. Conf., Reform of 28 U.S.C. § 1500, Proposed Recommendation, available at 
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=748, 
adopted by Comm. on Judicial Review, Meeting, Oct. 17, 2012, available at 
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adequate remedy by a money judgment and that duplicative litigation therefore was 
easily avoided without meaningful hardship. 
2. The Specific Implications of Tohono O’odham Nation for Forum Selection in 
Indian Breach of Trust Cases 
As discussed immediately above, by forcing an election of legal theory or 
remedy in a manner that could deprive a claimant of a full or perhaps any recovery, 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1500 in Tohono O’odham Nation may have 
material and detrimental consequences for claimants against the federal 
government in certain discrete contexts. But in the very legal context in which it 
arose—Indian breach of trust claims—the Tohono O’odham Nation decision will 
not force American Indian tribal and individual claimants into an election that 
deprives them of a complete and healthy remedy against the federal government for 
any breach of fiduciary duties. Instead, the Tohono O’odham Nation case highlights 
the more fundamental question of the proper forum for a claim against the 
sovereign United States and the risks of attempting to bypass the jurisdictional 
limitations placed on claims against the United States. 
a. Tohono O’odham Nation and the Proper Forum for a Breach of Trust Claim 
The Tohono O’odham Nation case was an odd platform for deciding the § 1500 
question.423 The Indian Nation filed a duplicative suit in a forum that lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the claim at all—the District Court, which did not have proper 
authority to hear what was a disguised Tucker Act claim.424 And the Nation could 
have obtained a complete remedy in the proper forum—the Court of Federal 
Claims, which could grant a money judgment with collateral equitable relief.425 
With respect to the tribal claims in the two parallel lawsuits in Tohono O’odham 
Nation, the government’s position has been that the breach of trust action filed in 
the CFC should be dismissed under § 1500, because of the pendency of the parallel 
breach of trust action in the District Court,426 and that the Nation’s action in the 
District Court should be dismissed on jurisdictional, sovereign immunity, and other 
grounds.427 The government thereby sought to reduce the number of lawsuits from 
two to zero. The Nation responded that both the CFC and the District Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 423. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–26, United States v. Tohono O’odham 
Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011) (No. 09-846) (Scalia, J.) (noting that, since “it’s far from 
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 424. See supra Part II.A, B.2–3. 
 425. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 426. See Brief for Petitioner at 14, 48, United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. 
Ct. 1723 (No. 09-846). 
 427. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss at 10–60, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Kempthorne, No. 06-2236-JR (D.D.C. June 
16, 2008). 
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lawsuits should be permitted to proceed along separate courses and conclude with 
dual judgments.428 Thus, the Nation had hoped to maintain two lawsuits. 
The Supreme Court rejected the Tohono O’odham Nation’s attempt to maintain 
two lawsuits and thus accepted the government’s position, at least in part. The 
continued viability of the District Court action remained an open question. 
Throughout this Article, I have maintained that the District Court lacks authority 
under the APA to hear Indian breach of trust lawsuits and that claim-splitting 
between federal courts contradicts the congressional purpose to centralize monetary 
claims in general and Indian breach of trust claims in particular in the CFC and the 
Federal Circuit. Accordingly, while a tribe is entitled to maintain one lawsuit, that 
single lawsuit should be placed in or moved to the CFC. Indian breach of trust 
claims filed in District Court action should be transferred to the CFC for unified 
adjudication under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act. 
In Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court reviewed a judgment by the 
CFC and necessarily focused on the § 1500 jurisdictional bar as applied to the CFC. 
Because the parallel District Court action was not before it, the Supreme Court did 
not directly address the District Court’s jurisdiction over a breach of trust claim. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court majority opinion casts doubt on the viability of a 
District Court action for such tribal claims and confirms the propriety of the CFC 
remedy. In responding to the Nation’s claim of hardship by supposedly being 
“forc[ed] . . . to choose between partial remedies available in different courts,” the 
majority said: “The hardship in this case is far from clear. The Nation could have 
filed in the CFC alone and if successful obtained monetary relief to compensate for 
any losses caused by the Government’s breach of duty.”429 The clear import of the 
statement, which arguably is not dictum because it was part of the reasoning behind 
the Court’s construction of § 1500, is that a money judgment in the CFC would be 
a full and not merely “partial” remedy. 
In response, the concurrence noted that the plaintiff sought an “equitable 
accounting” in the District Court and observed that, more than forty years ago, the 
CFC’s predecessor had held it “lacks jurisdiction to issue a preliability 
accounting.”430 Importantly, however, the concurring justices acknowledged that, 
more recently, the Federal Circuit had suggested the availability of an accounting in 
the CFC through its “ancillary relief” authority.431 (This additional remedial power 
was granted by Congress subsequent to that earlier Court of Claims decision 
disavowing power to order a preliability accounting.432) 
Moreover, given that the Nation was alleging a past breach of trust with past 
economic harm—in both the District Court and CFC—the availability of a 
“preliability” accounting remedy was beside the point. In typical Indian breach of 
trust litigation, tribes or tribe members do not contend that the government simply 
                                                                                                                 
 
 428. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 18, at 16–17. 
 429. United States v.Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1730–31 (2011). 
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failed to provide a periodic statement or annual report, that is, they do not claim 
that the government’s failure is merely one of omission in not disclosing 
information. Rather, Native American plaintiffs in trust account cases invariably 
argue that the government has breached its fiduciary duty by mismanaging the trust 
accounts such that the statements of balances do not accurately reflect the true 
amounts and that funds have not been properly invested, resulting in financial 
injury. In other words, the claims already are post-liability. And the ability of the 
CFC to account for the retrospective harm caused by the government’s breach of 
fiduciary duties is not truly in dispute. 
The question upon which the District Court’s jurisdiction over an Indian breach 
of trust claim under the APA hinges is whether there is an “adequate remedy”433 in 
another court, such as the CFC. The Supreme Court majority in Tohono O’odham 
Nation saw the money judgment remedy in the CFC for the breach of trust as 
dispelling any tribal claim of hardship by being left to a partial remedy. In sum, the 
monetary compensation due to a successful tribal plaintiff under the Indian Tucker 
Act (and collateral equitable relief available to the CFC under the Remand Act) 
plainly counts as an “adequate” remedy and thus supersedes an alternative recourse 
to the APA. 
b. Implications for Tribes That Filed Breach of Trust Claims Only in Court of 
Federal Claims 
What then lies ahead for Indian tribes and tribe members who wish to pursue 
breach of trust claims against the United States? 
For those Native American plaintiffs who file or have filed breach of trust suits 
solely in the CFC, they have chosen the wiser course and the Tohono O’odham 
Nation decision confirms their wisdom. If their claims are successful on the merits 
(by establishing a fiduciary relationship and proving a breach and damages), they 
can obtain a full remedy in the CFC and do so in a single lawsuit. They may 
recover both (1) a money judgment for any financial harm, by reason of 
misallocation of funds, mismanagement of resources, failure to properly invest or 
seek a profit on funds or resources, etc.; and (2) an accounting or its equivalent of 
pertinent tribal assets through discovery and the CFC’s collateral equitable powers 
to order the correction of records or remand the matter to administrative or 
executive bodies or officials with directions to reconcile accounts.434 
Moreover, those tribes that have brought a single action in the CFC may rest 
easy that they have not thereby surrendered an accounting remedy of broader 
scope, which might have been available in the District Court. After the Jicarilla 
Apache ruling, a cause of action for an equitable accounting outside of statutory 
limits is no longer cognizable in District Court.435 Indeed, even if viable in the 
District Court under the APA directly, a claim for accounting only, that is, a claim 
solely for information and reconciliation, is limited by Jicarilla Apache to the 
specific statutory guidelines governing disclosure of trust account information and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 433. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 434. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 435. See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
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reconciliation of balances436 and likely may not be augmented by restitutionary 
claims that seek an infusion of money.437 By contrast, the CFC may well have 
broader authority to secure evidence about trust account handling or the 
government’s actions with respect to non-monetary assets, when adjudicating a 
breach of trust action under the Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act.438 And, of course, 
the CFC may award a money judgment for past financial harm, however 
formulated in theory or remedy.439 
c. Implications for Tribes Considering Forum in Which to File Breach of Trust 
Claims in the Future (Order-of-Filing Rule) 
For those Native American plaintiffs who plan to file future Indian breach of 
trust suits, they would be well-advised to go directly to the CFC and file a single 
suit for a full remedy under the Tucker Act or the Indian Tucker Act. Attempting to 
bypass the CFC by an APA suit in the District Court is a risky course that is likely 
to be foreclosed altogether by the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit, sooner or 
later. And, again, even if viable in District Court, an APA action for an accounting 
is now limited by the specific statutory guidelines on disclosure of information 
about trust funds. The scope of breach of trust litigation in the CFC is at least as 
broad and likely much broader. 
Nor should tribes or tribe members in the future assume they may file 
simultaneous lawsuits in both the CFC and the District Court by simply reversing 
the order of filing (the so-called Tecon rule), attempting to rely on prior Federal 
Circuit precedent that the CFC does not lose jurisdiction to continue under § 1500 
when a parallel District Court suit is filed afterward.440 Although the Supreme 
Court in Tohono O’odham Nation did not reach the question,441 many observers 
believe the handwriting for the Tecon exception is on the wall.442 
Advocates for a time-of-filing interpretation of § 1500 observe that the 
predecessor statute “proscribed both filing and prosecuting any claim,” but that 
subsequent amendments removed that language, so that “the statute no longer 
contains a proscription against prosecuting a claim.”443 Critics of the Tecon rule 
respond that the “prosecuting” phrase was replaced by jurisdictional language with 
the codification of Title 28 of the United States Code in 1948,444 which the code 
reviser characterized as a mere change in “phraseology only” without substantive 
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change.445 With specific reference to § 1500, the Supreme Court has said that, in 
the “comprehensive revision of the Judicial Code completed in 1948, we do not 
presume that the revision worked a change in the underlying substantive law 
‘unless an intent to make such [a] chang[e] is clearly expressed.’”446 
Supporters of the Tecon rule read the words “has pending” in § 1500447 as 
“constitut[ing] a present participle which ‘convey[s] the same meaning’ as the 
present perfect tense and ‘indicates action that was started in the past and has 
recently been completed or is continuing up to the present time.’”448 On this line of 
reasoning, it is argued, the plain meaning “calls for a determination of the order in 
which two or more suits were filed.”449 
That, however, begs the question of what is the pertinent “present time.” Is it the 
date of the filing of the suit in the CFC or the date on which a suit is later filed in 
District Court (prompting a government motion to dismiss under § 1500)? 
Indeed, the opponents of the order-of-filing exception read the very same “has 
pending” language as barring continuing jurisdiction in the CFC without making 
any “distinction . . . concerning the time of filing of that other suit.”450 In addition, 
§ 1500 directs that the CFC “shall not have jurisdiction,”451 using a present tense 
verb for describing the CFC’s authority to hear a matter when an action arising 
from the same claim has been filed in another court.452 
Looking to the general law of subject matter jurisdiction, a plausible argument 
could be made for the order-of-filing exception. Under some other jurisdictional 
statutes, the pertinent point in time for determining federal court jurisdiction is the 
time of filing.453 Thus, under the “well-pleaded complaint rule” that governs 
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federal-question jurisdiction, jurisdiction attaches or fails immediately upon the 
filing of the plaintiff’s complaint, which must raise a federal law issue as part of the 
affirmative cause of action, without regard to federal law issues later raised by the 
defendant.454 For diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, the domicile of the parties at 
the time the complaint is filed controls, such that jurisdiction is not created or lost 
even if the parties change domicile afterward.455 
Extended to § 1500, then, if there is no other suit pending when the CFC action 
is filed, application of this general rule would mean that CFC jurisdiction attaches 
and will not be divested by subsequent events, such as a later-filed action in District 
Court. Moreover, as observed by one judge on the Court of Federal Claims in 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. United States,456 this interpretation of § 1500 would 
preclude “forum manipulation” by a plaintiff who “becomes unhappy with the 
course of litigation” 457 in the CFC and then tries to divest the CFC of continuing 
jurisdiction by filing a parallel action in the District Court. 
However, each jurisdictional statute must be read according to its own terms and 
congressional purpose. As a withdrawal rather than a grant of jurisdiction, § 1500 
arguably should be approached from a different perspective. When a District Court 
assumes jurisdiction under the federal-question or diversity-of-citizenship statutes, 
the general rule that jurisdiction is not later lost because of a post-filing change of 
circumstances does not prevent those statutes from serving their fundamental 
purposes. By contrast, treating § 1500 as turning on timing converts the operation 
of the statute into a jurisdictional game and makes its application chimerical.458 As 
Craig Schwartz writes, not only is the order-of-filing interpretation of § 1500 
“entirely at odds with its intended purpose,” but “[p]erversely, it encourages 
plaintiffs to double-file in order to preserve access to the CFC.”459 
As a contrasting statutory example, consider the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which authorizes the District Court to hear certain claims 
without an independent jurisdictional basis if those claims “form part of the same 
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution” that is the 
basis for the federal court’s original jurisdiction.460 However, continuing exercise 
of jurisdiction by the District Court over supplemental claims may be declined 
based on events subsequent to filing, such as when “the district court has dismissed 
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”461 Thus, while the jurisdictional 
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power to hear a supplemental claim “ordinarily was determined on the pleadings, 
the question whether to exercise that power remained open throughout the 
litigation.”462 Just as the efficiency raison d'être for adjudicating a state-law 
supplemental jurisdiction claim typically falls away when the underlying federal-
question jurisdiction claim is dismissed before trial, the purpose of § 1500 in 
relieving both the federal government and the courts from the burdens of 
simultaneous, duplicative litigation may be triggered when a District Court action 
is later filed while a case arising from the same operative facts is still before the 
CFC. 
In Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court rejected a “different remedy” 
exception to § 1500 by saying that it would turn the provision into “a mere pleading 
rule, to be circumvented by carving up a single transaction into overlapping pieces 
seeking different relief.”463 Treating § 1500 as “a mere time-of-filing rule” that 
could be “circumvented” by arranging to file the CFC lawsuit one day, or even a 
few hours, before filing the District Court lawsuit makes the provision arbitrary.464 
Given the Court’s description of the statute’s manifest purpose to “save the 
Government from burdens of redundant litigation,” notably including the costs of 
“[d]iscovery . . . and the preparation and examination of witnesses at trial,”465 that 
purpose would be undermined if a party could maintain duplicative litigation 
against the United States whenever it carefully timed one lawsuit to start before the 
other.466 And, while stopping short of deciding the issue in that case, the Tohono 
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Court lawsuit was pending when the CFC suit was instituted, even though the District Court 
lawsuit was subsequently dismissed while the CFC litigation remained pending. Keene Corp. 
v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207–09 (1993). The strongest answer to this observation 
would be to interpret § 1500 as meaning that the CFC irrevocably loses jurisdiction at the 
point in time that duplicative litigation emerges in another court, whether that litigation 
arises immediately on the date of filing in the CFC or arrives subsequently. With the 
animating purpose of § 1500 being to avoid the burdens of duplicative litigation, those 
burdens are imposed whenever the District Court action is initiated and overlaps in time with 
the CFC action. The burden of duplicative litigation having been realized, the burden cannot 
be undone by a subsequent dismissal of the District Court action. Thus, having lost 
jurisdiction at the moment in time that duplication of litigation against the government 
occurs, the CFC cannot regain jurisdiction, even if the District Court action is dismissed 
before the CFC acknowledges its loss of jurisdiction by granting the motion to dismiss. 
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O’odham Nation Court faulted the Federal Circuit for relying on precedents, 
specifically noting the Tecon order-of-filing decision, “that left the statute without 
meaningful force.”467 
d. Implications for Tribes That Filed Duplicative Breach of Trust Claims in the 
District Court and the Court of Federal Claims 
For those tribes that have filed duplicative lawsuits in the wake of Cobell, the 
path forward is not clearly marked. I am optimistic that by changing course and 
bringing those breach of trust claims home to the CFC, those tribes still may obtain 
a complete remedy, even if settlement with the United States is not forthcoming.468 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tohono O’odham Nation obviously requires 
dismissal of the CFC version of breach of trust claims when another version is 
pending in District Court. The question remains whether the District Court vehicle 
for a breach of trust claim remains viable, in one way or another. Even if the 
District Court action is not precluded by limitations in the APA or by the 
exclusivity of the Indian Tucker Act remedy in the CFC, the District Court likely 
lacks authority to award monetary relief, however framed, and certainly cannot 
award monetary relief that is compensatory in nature. 
First, although uncertain to succeed, tribes in the position of previously having 
filed duplicative suits may decide to stick it out, await the conclusion of the District 
Court litigation, and then attempt to follow up with successive litigation in the 
CFC, despite the passage of time. In Tohono O’odham Nation, the Supreme Court 
majority raised the possibility that the statute of limitations for bringing an action in 
the CFC might be tolled, although the Court hedged that bet. The majority observed 
“Congress has provided in every appropriations Act for the Department of Interior 
since 1990 that the statute of limitations on Indian trust mismanagement claims 
shall not run until the affected tribe has been given an appropriate accounting.”469 
However, in its concluding passage, the Court made plain that this was not a 
definitive ruling, saying that the tribe could re-file a claim in the CFC “if the statute 
of limitations is no bar.” 470 
Given that the tribes have asserted failure by the government to provide an 
“appropriate accounting” in their District Court actions, if they were to succeed on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 467. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1729 (citing Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United 
States, 170 Ct. Cl. 389 (1965)). 
 468. Of course, the matter may always be resolved by settlement. As discussed 
previously, in April 2012, forty-one tribes settled their claims with the United States, 
although more than sixty other tribal claims were still proceeding. See supra notes 349–350 
and accompanying text. Prior to that settlement, seventy-six tribes that had filed breach of 
trust claims involving tribal trust fund accounts in the CFC and/or District Court were 
engaged in confidential settlement discussions with the United States. See Parties’ Joint 
Stipulation and Order Regarding Confidentiality of Settlement Discussions and 
Communications, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Salazar, No. 06-CV-2236-JR (D.D.C. Aug. 
25, 2011). 
 469. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1731 (citing, e.g., Act of Oct. 30, 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-88, 123 Stat. 2904, 2922; Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104 Stat. 
1915, 1930). 
 470. Id. (emphasis added). 
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the merits, then by definition the statute of limitations would not run until the 
government has corrected those errors. In light of the Supreme Court’s later ruling 
in Jicarilla Apache, which narrows the scope of information that a tribe may 
demand from the government to that which the trust account statutes specifically 
prescribe,471 the government may respond that the periodic reports already provided 
to the tribes, perhaps even if they contain errors, constitute the “appropriate 
accounting” contemplated by Congress.472 If the government’s position is accepted, 
then the statute of limitations has long been running. Moreover, the concurring 
justices in Tohono O’odham Nation noted that the appropriations statute tolling the 
statute of limitations for CFC claims by tribes only applies to trust fund claims and 
“does not appear to toll the statute of limitations for claims concerning assets other 
than funds, such as tangible assets.”473 
Second, and the better course of action in my view, tribes that have filed 
duplicative lawsuits in both the District Court and the CFC should reconsider and 
change course in light of these new Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
jurisdictional rulings. They now should seek to transfer the District Court actions to 
the CFC. In this way, the tribes would preserve their one remaining lawsuit and be 
able to prosecute it to a more complete judgment under the Indian Tucker Act. 
Even though the previous CFC action has been dismissed under § 1500, the 
pending District Court action could be transferred to the CFC under § 1631 of Title 
28474 and arrive as effectively a new filing (but with the statute of limitations 
having been tolled by the earlier filing of the District Court action). 
To be sure, § 1631 is not a permissive transfer statute and thus allows movement 
of the case from the District Court to the CFC only if the District Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction. Based on the Cobell precedent in the District of 
Columbia federal courts, the tribes thus far have been insisting that jurisdiction 
properly lies in the District Court.475 If they so choose, however, the tribes could 
fairly argue to the District Court that the jurisdictional landscape has changed with 
Tohono O’odham Nation and Jicarilla Apache. 
Even if the District Court were unwilling to grant a transfer, feeling still bound 
by the Cobell precedent, the tribe and the government both could appeal the denial 
of a transfer under the special interlocutory appeal provision in § 1292(d)(4) of 
Title 28.476 That appeal lies to the Federal Circuit, not to the D.C. Circuit, and the 
Federal Circuit almost surely would order the case transferred to the CFC.477 In the 
end, however winding may be the path, a single lawsuit for breach of trust 
eventually should find its way to the CFC. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 471. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 472. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss at 2, 27, Tohono O’odham Nation v. Kempthorne, No. 06-2236-JR (D.D.C. June 16, 
2008) (arguing that the government’s specific duties to reconcile tribal trust accounts as 
required by the 1994 statute were satisfied in 1996). 
 473. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1735 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 474. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006).  
 475. See supra Part II.A. 
 476. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4) (2006). 
 477. See supra Parts I.C, II.B.2. 
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Under the Federal Circuit’s ruling in United States v. County of Cook,478 § 1500 
would bar the CFC from taking jurisdiction if only part of the District Court action 
were transferred under § 1631, while the District Court retained another part. 479 
The result of a partial transfer would be duplicative and simultaneously pending 
claims in both courts. Accordingly, the transfer option for restoring Indian breach 
of trust plaintiffs to a complete remedy would require transfer of the entire District 
Court proceeding to the CFC, to then proceed as the sole action, the nature and 
scope of which presumably could be clarified and supplemented by appropriate 
amendments to the pleadings in the CFC that would relate-back under civil 
procedure rules. 
If the tribes are reluctant to take this course, the United States always has had 
the power to cut to the jurisdictional chase by filing a motion under § 1631 to 
transfer tribal suits now pending in the District Court. Even if the District Court 
should deny the motion to transfer, the government would be empowered to take an 
interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit under § 1292(d)(4)(A).480 And because 
the Federal Circuit already has signaled its agreement that Indian breach of trust 
claims can be remedied by a money judgment and should be heard in the CFC, the 
transfer would be successfully accomplished. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation well 
illustrates the dangers of seeking to bypass the Court of Federal Claims by seeking 
relief in the wrong place and by disguising what is essentially a claim for money as 
something else. By departing from established jurisprudence—that Indian breach of 
trust claims involving the federal government’s fiduciary administration of Native 
American assets and funds are to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims—the 
District Court for the District of Columbia created the conditions conducive to a 
jurisdictional conflagration. As dozens of American Indian tribes filed duplicative 
suits in both the District Courts and the Court of Federal Claims, a jurisdictional 
collision became inevitable and the impact will resonate for years to come. 
Given that the CFC has ample powers to afford a rich set of remedies in Indian 
breach of trust and similar cases, including both a money judgment and collateral 
equitable-type relief, tribal plaintiffs’ attempts at forum shopping were unnecessary 
and unwise. If the courts continue to confirm the traditional and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CFC over claims that can be adequately remedied by a money 
judgment (and collateral relief), then claimants will have no reason to file parallel 
lawsuits purportedly seeking different relief in multiple courts. At least with respect 
                                                                                                                 
 
 478. 170 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 479. Id. at 1087, 1090.  
 480. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A). In fact, the United States did move for a transfer to 
the CFC in one of the multiple breach of trust claims filed by tribes in District Court for the 
District of Columbia. See Osage Tribe of Indians v. United States, No. CIVA04-0283(RCL), 
2005 WL 578171, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2005). However, the government subsequently 
dismissed its appeal to the Federal Circuit, Order Dismissing Appeal, Osage Tribe of Indians 
v. United States, No. 05-1383 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2005), thereby pretermitting early resolution 
of the jurisdictional question by the appellate court designated by Congress. 
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to Indian breach of trust cases, the jurisdictional fog will lift and the problem of 
duplicative litigation will evaporate. 
Through this ongoing clarification of jurisdictional lines and respect for the 
institutional integrity of the CFC, the path to a single Tucker Act suit for claims 
grounded in financial disputes, such as Indian breach of trust claims, will be even 
more clearly marked. When “[a]t bottom it is a suit for money,” then “the Court of 
Federal Claims can provide an adequate remedy, and it therefore belongs in that 
court.”481 
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